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Doherty: www.Obscenity.com

WWW.OBSCENITY.COM:
AN ANALYSIS OF OBSCENITY AND I NDECENCY REGULATION ON THE I NTERNET
“ ‘Uncle Sam Out Of My Homepage!’ ” 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you sit down at your personal computer and log on to the Internet to
access Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr’s recent report on the alleged relationship
between President Clinton and Monica Lewinsky.2 To your surprise, a screen appears
requesting you input your credit card number to prove you are of the requisite age to
view the report. Now imagine you have no credit card, or more realistically, you do not
feel comfortable giving your credit card number to an unknown party over a
communication system which spans the globe. Therefore, because you do not own a
credit card or you wish to maintain your privacy, you are prohibited from reading
constitutionally protected material regarding the developments in our nation’s
democracy. Unfortunately, this is the reality of the Child Online Protection Act
(COPA),3 Congress’ latest attempt to regulate Internet content.
This comment explores the constitutionality of federal regulations as applied to
Internet content and alternatives to government regulation. Part II provides background
on the Internet, First Amendment obscenity and indecency law as applied to
communications media, and past and current legislation enacted to regulate Internet
content. Part III analyzes the constitutionality of COPA, and discusses why other
alternatives are more effective and preferable to government regulation. Part IV
concludes that protecting children from harmful Internet content is the responsibility of
parents, and therefore, Internet regulation should begin at home.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Internet: Its History and How it Works
The Internet began in 1969 as a project of the Advanced Research Project Agency
Network, ARPANET, a branch of the Department of Defense. 4 The Agency set up a
1

Janelle Brown, CDA--The Sequel, SALON M AGAZINE (Sept. 23, 1998)
<http://www.salonmagazine.com/ 21st/feature/1998/09/23feature2.html> [hereinafter Sequel].
2

The government released the Starr Report over the Internet on September 11, 1998. USA
Today
Tech
Report
(visited
Oct.
15,
1998)
<http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/ctd392.htm>. The report was available on the
following
government
web
sites:
<http://thomas.loc.gov/icreport>,
<http://www.house.gov/icreport>,
http://www.
access.gpo.gov/congress/icreport>,
<http://www.house.gov/judiciary>.
3
PUB . L. NO. 105-277, 112 STAT . 2681 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1998)). On November
19, 1998, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted a
motion for a temporary restraining order and halted enforcement of COPA until a court
resolves its constitutionality. Michael Rubinkam, Judge Suspends Internet Law, The Child
Online Protection Act Seeks to Protect Children From Online Pornography,YORKDAILY
RECORD (Philadelphia), Nov. 20, 1998, at A-02. On February 1, 1999, United States District
Judge Lowell A. Reed issued a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of COPA. Leslie
Miller, Judge Block’s Net Porn Law Ruling Cites Free-Speech Protection, USA TODAY, Feb.
2, 1999 at 01A, available in Westlaw PAPERS File.
4
Maureen A. O’Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82
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computer network via phone lines designed to withstand nuclear attack so that the
government and researchers could communicate over great distances, regardless of the
type of computer used.5 Computers from universities, corporations, and individuals
began to connect to the network and by the late 1980’s, it evolved into a giant network
of networks.6
The Internet consists of computers linked together to form small networks, and
those networks are linked to other networks through routers7 and software protocols.8
The first step in reaching speech on the Internet is obtaining access through a service
provider.9 Next, the user’s computer is linked to that of the provider through a
modem.10 Once logged on, users may access various methods of communication such
as e-mail, 11 electronic bulletin boards,12 or the world wide web.13 The world wide web
M INN. L. REV. 609, 615 and n. 13 (1998) (describing the origins of the Internet and noting how
the Department of Defense wanted to make computer communication available between
government-funded researchers and the government, regardless of their geographic location
and the type of machine being used).
5
Id. at 615 and n.14; John T. Delacourt, The International Impact of Internet Regulation,
38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 207, 218 n.59 (1997) (discussing how the United States Department of
Defense developed the Internet in an effort to maintain communications during war time).
6
See, e.g., GRAHAM J.H. SMITH, INTERNET LAW AND REGULATION 1 (2nd ed. 1997); ACLU v.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) [hereinafter Reno I]; Lesli
C. Esposito, Note, Regulating the Internet: The New Battle Against Child Pornography, 30
CASE W. RES . J. INT’L L. 541, 548-49 (1998) (discussing the history of the Internet, examining
the regulation of child pornography on the Internet, and concluding an international structure
of regulation and enforcement is necessary for successful regulation).
7
SMITH, supra note 6, at 3. Routers are computers designed to receive and forward data.
Id.
8
Id. at 1-3 (describing an overview of the Internet); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Property and
Innovation in the Global Information Infrastructure, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 286 (1996).
This system enables anyone with a computer and a modem to connect the computer to the
telephone line and communicate with anyone also connected in the same way. O’Rourke,
supra note 4, at 616. Generally, this communication consists of sharing information directly
with other users, as well as posting and retrieving information made available by other users.
Kimberly A. Gobla, Comment, The Infeasibility of Federal Internet Regulation: The Online
Parental Control Act of 1996 -- A Reaction to the Communications Decency Act of 1996,
102 DICK. L. REV. 93, 96 (1997).
9
TRACY LAQUEY, THE INTERNET COMPANION: A BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO GLOBAL
NETWORKING 113 (2nd ed. 1994) (noting that a service provider offers access to the Internet
and can be a company or an individual); SMITH, supra note 6, at 9-10 (stating a typical service
provider is a commercial organization that sells Internet access to commercial and home users
and offers a variety of services such as web site hosting and design and software
distribution).
10
Eric Handelman, Comment, Obscenity and the Internet: Does the Current Obscenity
Standard Provide Individuals with the Proper Constitutional Safeguards? , 59 A LB. L. REV.
709, 711 (1995) (describing how pornographic images are transmitted over the Internet and
how finding an Internet service, such as a bulletin board service (BBS), is like a database like
Westlaw or LEXIS because users can retrieve information from the BBS, but it is also different
in that users can leave information on the BBS for other users).
11
E-mail is similar to traditional paper mail in that it allows correspondence to take place.
Joseph N. Campolo, Note, Childporn.Gif: Establishing Liability for On-Line Service
Providers, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP . MEDIA & ENT . L.J. 721, 739 (1996). However, an
individual may instantly respond to, store, or delete an e-mail. Id. at 740. Additionally, it
allows messages to be sent to large mailing lists with just a few keystrokes. Id.
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is the most popular method of communication because it is easy to use. 14 Users may
access and transmit pictures, videos, sound and text on the web.15
Every document on the web has a unique address called a Uniform Resource
Locator (URL) 16 and the documents are stored on servers throughout the world.17 Any
user can create a “home page” with his own URL, so others may access the web site.18
The content of these web sites and documents may contain sexually explicit material
and other material harmful to children.19 This troubles many parents because of the
accessibility of those images by “pointing-and-clicking” with the computer mouse, 20 a
task simple enough for a small child to perform.
Internet growth has been drastic in the last decade. The number of computers that
store information and relay communications, also known as host computers, has risen
from approximately 300 in 1981, to 36,739,000 in 1998.21 In 1992, the estimated range
of Internet users was ten to twenty-five million.22 In 1998, 157 million people had
access worldwide, according to estimates, and the projected number for the end of
2000 is 327 million.23 In the United States alone, 70.5 million (34.9%) of approximately
202 million adults currently use the Internet.24
12

There are approximately 5,000 newsgroups on the Internet and each is focused on an
area of particular interest where users with that interest can read and respond to messages.
Robert F. Goldman, Note, Put Another Log on the Fire, There’s a Chill on the Internet: The
Effect of Applying Current Anti-Obscenity Laws to Online Communications, 29 GA. L. REV.
1075, 1086 (1995). Some newsgroups are devoted to sex and/or pornography. Id. at 1086-87.
Electronic bulletin boards (EBBs) are similar to electronic town meetings. Campolo, supra
note 11, at 741. A user picks a board, reads the messages, and replies. Id. EEBs are located
primarily on the Internet. Id.
13
The world wide web enables users to access the hard drive of others. Goldman, supra
note 12, at 1088. Users may access text, images, recordings, and video images posted on the
Web. Id.; see also Angela E. Wu, Comment, Spinning a Tighter Web: The First Amendment
and Internet Regulation, 17 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 263, 269 (1997) (describing the most common
means of communication over the Internet, including one-to-one messaging, one-to-many
messaging, distributed message databases real time communication, and remote information
retrieval).
14
Reno I, 929 F. Supp. 824, 838 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
15
Id. at 834.
16
Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 117 S. Ct. 2501 (1997).
17
Id.
18
Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 836-37.
19
James V. Dobeus, Comment, Rating Internet Content and the Spectre of Government
Regulation, 16 J. M ARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 625, 631 (1998); Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at
844; see generally Jamie N. Nafziger, Time To Pay Up: Internet Service Providers’ Universal
Service Obligations Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 16 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 37 (1997) (discussing the efforts of the FCC to assert jurisdiction over
the Internet).
20
Goldman, supra note 12, at 1083.
21
Mark K. Lottor, Network Wizards Internet Domain Survey (visited Oct. 15, 1998)
<http://www.nw.com/zone/host-count-history>.
22
Randolph Stuart Sergent, The “Hamlet” Fallacy: Computer Networks and the
Geographic Roots of Obscenity Regulation, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 671, 672 (1996)
(providing statistics on the Internet’s rapid growth and discussing how the Internet has
changed the way the world communicates due to its ability to relay communication
instantaneously).
23
Global
Internet
Statistics
(visited
Oct.
15,
1998)
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A recent example of the increased use and technological achievement of the Internet
is the release of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr’s report to Congress on the alleged
relationship between President Bill Clinton and Monica Lewinsky. The government
voted to release the 445-page report to the public via the Internet on September 11,
1998, and in a matter of hours the full text was available online. 25 The traffic of
millions of people attempting to download the document overwhelmed parts of the
Internet. For example, the number of users accessing the CNN web site was more
than 300,000 per minute before the report was even available online. 26 That number
peaked at 340,000, breaking the record set August 31, 1998 set when the stock market
average plunged.27 On the afternoon the government released the report, only one in
ten attempts to access the House of Representatives’ web site succeeded.28 The
slowdown was felt all across the Internet.29 According to one source,
[t]o longtime Internet watchers, the real news about the release of the Starr report
was the use of the global network as the primary means of distributing unfiltered,
primary news to millions of Americans. ‘This is an historic event . . . [which] shows
that the net is making an impact on our nation’s democracy.’30

While the ability to regulate the increased number of Internet users is a concern to
the government, the real issue for both Congress and parents is what material is made
available via the Internet and how it may affect children.31 Approximately one-fifth of
<http://www.euromktg.com/globstats/>.
24
USA
Today
Tech
Report
(visited
Oct.
15,
1998)
<http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/ctd392.htm>.
25
Darnell Little and Kelly McEvers, A Wide Net Casts for Starr Report, (visited Sept. 11,
1998) <http://chicagotribune.com/news/ nationworld/wsitem/0,1267,2899-2938-14399,00.html>.
Congress posted the report on four of the government web sites and gave copies to the top
commercial news sites. Id. Aaron Pressman (Reuters), Internet Withstands Crush of Starr
Report
Seekers
(visited
Sept.
11,
1998)
<http://dailynews.yahoo.com/headlines/p1/story.html?s-v/nm/19980911/p1/internet_3.html>.
Yahoo!, an Internet search engine, was one of the first web sites to publish the report. Little
& McEvers, supra. It uploaded the document from the House of Representatives at 1:45 p.m.
CST and five minutes later it was available on the web. Id.
26
Chris Allbritton, Millions Swamp Internet for Report (visited Sept. 11, 1998)
<http://dailynews.yahoo.com/headlines/
ap/washington/story.html?sv/ap980911/washington/stories/clinton_internet_1.html>.
27
Pressman, supra note 25.
28
Id.
29
Allbritton, supra note 26.
30
Pressman, supra note 25 (quoting Internet political consultant and co-founder of
Mindshare Internet Campaigns, Jonah Seiger). But see Murray Fromson, Online Journalism
Review: Triumph of r the Internet, Tragedy for the Country? (visited Sept. 11, 1998)
<http://orj.usc.edu/sections/news/98_stories/ ojrnews_fromson_ 091198.htm> (“The Internet
speed of news delivery is unquestionably a technological achievement, but the hasty flashing
of raw and salacious data to an eagerly awaiting world market may prove tragic.”).
31
Brian M. Werst, Comment, A Survey of the First Amendment “Indecency” Legal
Doctrine and Its Inapplicability to Internet Regulation: A Guide for Protecting Children
from Internet Indecency After Reno v. ACLU, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 207, 208 (1998) (arguing the
nature of the Internet and the goal of protecting children does not warrant regulating the
Internet because there is very little chance that children will accidentally access indecent
material on the Internet, and concluding that because of the global nature of the Internet,
Congress may need to find an international answer or rely on the parents to monitor their

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol32/iss2/2

4

Doherty: www.Obscenity.com

1999]
WWW.OBSCENITY.COM
users of the world wide web regularly view at least one of the over six hundred
available commercial pornography sites, and the number of these sites increases daily
by thirty-nine. 32 The Internet is an easy avenue for the distribution of pornography due
to the anonymity of the distributor and receiver through the use of passwords.33 Much
of the illegal Internet pornographic material is encrypted and law enforcement cannot
access the content of such material without the passwords, which are available only
from the sender or receiver.34 Another concern is the relative simplicity of viewing
pornography online for a person of any age with only modest experience. 35 Because
there are many adult bulletin board services 36 on the web, access to free pornographic
images only requires a mouse click on a button labeled “yes” when a person is
presented with the question, “Are you 18 years of age or older?”37
A recent case showing the impact of easy access and exchange of harmful material
to children involves forty-two year-old Francis Kufrovich of Woodland Hills,
California. 38 Kufrovich used the Internet to attempt to lure a thirteen year-old
Connecticut girl into having sex with him.39 When he first contacted the girl on the
children’s access).
32
Id. at 208; see also Sara Silver, Sex Sells Briskly in Cyberspace, Creating Lucrative
New Industry with Internet as Gateway to Private-Site Peep Shows, Porn May Again Take
Lead in Spurring New Technology, A KRON BEACON JOURNAL, June 18, 1997, at C7 (describing
the Internet sex oriented business developed by Madeleine Altmann in New York City).
33
Marc S. Friedman and Kristin Bissinger, “Infojacking”: Crimes on the Information
Super Highway, 9 No. 5 J. PROPRIETARY RTS . May, 1997, at 2, 9 (stating that America Online
now offers a “kids-only” chat room because pornography is prevalent on the Internet).
Another problem with anonymity on the Internet stems from the use of “anonymous
remailers.” Id. at 8. Some pedophiles utilize remailers to re-send email messages using a
fictitious origin. Id. Children who receive such emails have no way of knowing if the sender
is a friend or a child abuser. Id. at 8-9.
34
Id. at 9 (discussing how both the sender and receiver of encrypted pornographic
material remain anonymous and the only effective way for authorities to infiltrate this type of
situation is an expensive and time-consuming investigation).
35
Anthony L. Clapes, The Wages of Sin: Pornography and Internet Providers,
COMPUTER LAW, July 1996, at 1, 2 (finding the technology industry should be responsible to
find a solution to protect children from online pornography, rather than parents, because
parents are less “net-savvy” then their children).
36
For information on bulletin board services (BBSs) and electronic bulletin boards (EBBs),
see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
37
Clapes, supra note 35, at 2-3.
38
Valley Man Faces Net Sex Charge, DAILY NEWS OF LOS A NGELES , July 24, 1997, at N1,
available in Westlaw, PAPERS File; see also Robyn Forman Pollack, Creating the Standards
of a Global Community: Regulating Pornography on the Internet -- An International
Concern, 10 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 467, 478-79 (1996) (discussing other recent cases
involving children being lured away from their homes and molested by computer pedophiles,
and how technology needs t o “catch-up” with the legal difficulties created by the Internet;
concluding that because the Internet is a global medium, regulation must be agreed upon
internationally, which includes reconciling legal venue and jurisdiction).
39
Valley Man Faces Net Sex Charge, supra note 38, at N1.
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Internet he pretended to be a teenager.40 Kufrovich allegedly tried to sexually assault
the young girl after meeting her in person.41
There was also the case of forty-seven year-old Paul Brown, Jr. of Cleveland,
Ohio.42 Brown used the Internet to entice female minors to send him sexually explicit
videos and pictures of themselves and to engage in sexual conduct.43 Police found
letters and photographs from fifteen girls, ages fourteen to sixteen, in his apartment.44
Authorities released Brown’s home and e-mail address in hopes of identifying other
victims.45
In another incident, a former high-school vice principal pleaded guilty to using the
Internet to lure teenage boys into having sexual relations with him.46 Lewis Powell,
fifty-six, admitted he used the Internet to talk to minors about “sexual fantasy stuff.”47
A recent poll found that indecency on the Internet was a concern of eighty-five
percent of Americans.48 However, there are two characteristics which make regulating
the Internet very difficult, its decentralization and openness.49 Simply stated, “[n]o one
40

Id.; see also Mike McPhee, Oregon Man Held in Internet Sex Sting, DENVER POST, Feb.
14, 1998, at B-03, available in Westlaw, PAPERS File (discussing the indictment of Steven
Tubbs, forty-two, who entered a chat room established for teenagers in order to contact “a
teen romate (sic) for cleaning and various personal services”).
41
Valley Man Faces Net Sex Charge, supra note 38, at N1. Kufrovich traveled to Irving,
Texas, where the girl went with her mother for a swim meet. Id. The mother intervened in the
assault. Id.
42
Prosecutors Seek Victims in Internet Sex Scandal, CHARLESTON DAILY M AIL, Feb. 21,
1997, at 3A, available in Westlaw, PAPERS File.
43
Id. Brown faces up to ten years in prison, as well as a $250,000 fine. Id.
44
Id. Police also found pictures of ten girls with only their first names written on the back.
Id.; see also Police Close Case About Internet Sex, A KRON BEACON JOURNAL, Sept. 16, 1998,
at B4, available in Westlaw, PAPERS File (noting the police seized and searched a suspect’s
computer and software to determine if a crime was committed after the police caught him in an
undercover operation where a detective posed as a fourteen year-old girl in a chatroom).
45
Prosecutors seek victims, supra note 42, at 3A. A U.S. Attorney urged parents to
check phone bills for calls to Brown’s telephone number. Id. Brown had six online accounts
and numerous e-mail addresses. Id.
46
Former Vice-Principal Pleads Guilty to Internet Sex Charge, LEDGER-ENQUIRER, Jan.
13, 1998, at B2, available in Westlaw PAPERS File.
47
Id.
48
Werst, supra note 31, at 209 (finding Internet pornography is the third largest area of
sales on the Internet with an estimated annual revenue of $100 million, and noting that many
adult Internet sites are accessed more than two million times in a one-month period).
In particular, the increased availability of indecency on the Internet has
generated a serious concern for children. The scores of amicus curiae that
participated in Internet regulation litigation pointed to the resulting harm to
children from exposure to sexual content on the Internet. Many of these parties
also argued that increased availability of pornography affects not only children,
but also the sexual attitudes of American adults.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Compare Peter Johnson, Pornography Drives Technology: Why Not
to Censor The Internet, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 217, 218 (1996) (stating pornography is a “positive
good” that not only encourages experimentation with various forms of new media, but has
economic value as well).
49
O’Rourke, supra note 4, at 617 (discussing how the Internet was designed so that if one
link in the network was broken there would be no disruption to the communication, and
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owns the Internet, thus no one controls it.”50 It is open to anyone with a computer and
modem,51 unbounded by geographical barriers, and its content “is as diverse as human
thought.”52 Therefore, controlling the content of the Internet is extremely difficult
because no one knows where the material originates, who is receiving the material, or if
it has crossed international boundaries.53
B. First Amendment Protection for Content-Based Regulations
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states that “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”54 However, the Constitution does
not protect all forms of speech.55 Obscene material does not receive any First
Amendment protection.56 Indecent speech, on the other hand, is constitutionally
protected and subject to strict scrutiny.57 This means that in order for a regulation to
survive strict scrutiny “the State must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”58 The strict
noting there is no organization responsible for regulating the Internet).
50
Pollack, supra note 38, at 467 (finding the Internet’s unique characteristics, including
the fact that it is unbounded, make it impractical to use existing laws to regulate Internet
content). “ ‘Almost like posters on telephone poles, the Internet appears to defy regulation.’”
Id. (quoting Warren Caragata, Crime in Cybercity, M ACLEAN’S , May 22, 1995, at 50).
51
O’Rourke, supra note 4, at 618 (noting the decentralization of the Internet is responsible
for its openness, as anyone with a personal computer and modem can connect to a computer
already linked in, and get access to the Internet).
52
Reno I, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). Chief Judge
Dolores Sloviter of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found regulation and
enforcement of the Internet was technologically impossible. Id. at 854; see generally
Lawrence Lessig, Reading The Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869 (1996)
(presenting the two arguments on how courts are to apply the Constitution to advanced
technology such as the Internet: (1) courts should be deferential for the time being to allow
ordinary understandings to catch up to technology; (2) courts should actively respond to the
Internet to protect citizens’ rights from being violated by increasing government
intervention).
53
Pollack, supra note 38, at 468.
54
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The full text of the First Amendment is: “Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” Id.
55
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341-46 (1974) (finding libelous statements
against private citizens receive less First Amendment protection than libelous statements
directed toward public figures); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (holding obscene
speech receives no First Amendment protection); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942) (finding under the First Amendment the government may forbid speech that
constitutes fighting words).
56
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
57
Sable Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431
U.S. 678, 701 (1977) (holding that just because protected speech may offend some people, it
does not justify suppression).
58
Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987); see also Samantha
L. Friel, Porn by Any Other Name? A Constitutional Alternative to Regulating “Victimless”
Computer-Generated Child Pornography, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 207, 234 (1997) (discussing
strict scrutiny and its application to computer generated child pornography that does not
involve child abuse, and concluding there should be a rebuttable presumption established
under federal law that a photograph that looks like a child engaging in sexual activity is child
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scrutiny standard is applied to any government legislation that limits the content of
protected speech.59 The following section provides an overview of the law relating to
obscene and indecent material.
1. Obscenity Law
In 1868, Lord Chief Justice Cockburn established the first obscenity test in Regina
v. Hicklin, 60 which involved a pamphlet describing the alleged immorality of Catholic
Priests. The Chief Justice defined the test as “[w]hether the tendency of the matter
charged . . . is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall.”61 The American
courts adopted that test until it came under great criticism.62 This led the Supreme
Court to adopt a different test in Roth v. United States. 63 There, the Court established
that obscene material is not constitutionally protected by the First Amendment64 and
defined the obscenity test as “whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
purient interest.”65 However, courts struggled to apply the Roth standard and
numerous opinions found the issue was unsettled.66
In Miller v. California, 67 the Supreme Court created the current obscenity test and
reaffirmed that obscene material is not constitutionally protected.68 The new three-part
standard is:
(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community standards”
would find that the work, when taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
pornography).
59
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York, 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991).
60
United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (citing L.R.-Q.B. 361 (Eng.
1868)).
61
Id.
62
Kennerley, 209 F. at 120-21 (Judge Learned Hand found the Hicklin test to be unduly
harsh because he believed it did not reflect the understanding and morality of the time);
United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses,” 5 F. Supp. 182, 184-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (rejecting
the Hicklin test and suggesting a pornographic intent standard with a determination of the
effect on an average reader).
63
354 U.S. 476 (1957). In Roth, the Court convicted the defendant of mailing obscene
books, photos and advertisements. Id. at 480.
64
Id. at 484-85.
65
Id. at 489.
66
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 79 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur
efforts to implement . . . [the Roth standard] demonstrate that agreement on the existence of
something called ‘obscenity’ is still a long and painful step from agreement on a workable
definition of the term.”); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 676, 704-05 (1968) (Harlan, J., separate
opinion) (finding the Roth approach has “produced a variety of views among the members of
the Court unmatched in any other course of constitutional adjudication”).
67
413 U.S. 15 (1973). In Miller, the Court affirmed the conviction of the defendant for
conducting a mass mailing which advertised the sale of adult material. Id. at 16. The
brochures contained explicit drawings of men and women in groups of two or more engaged
in sexual activities. Id. at 18.
68
Id. at 23.
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specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.69

Significantly, the Court recognized that “[i]t is neither realistic nor constitutionally
sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City.”70
Therefore, the test incorporated a community standard, as opposed to a “national”
standard.71
In Ginsberg v. New York, 72 the Court employed a slightly different application of
obscenity law toward children. The Ginsberg Court affirmed the conviction of a
defendant who distributed material considered “harmful to minors” to children under
age seventeen.73 The Court found that the State has a compelling interest in protecting
the welfare of children.74 It held that the State could bar the distribution of obscene
69

Donald T. Stepka, Obscenity On-Line: A Transactional Approach to Computer
Transfers of Potentially Obscene Material, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 917 (1997) (summarizing
the test from Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)). The test described in layman’s
terms is as follows:
[T]he trial court would ask something like these four questions:
Error! Main Document Only..
Is it designed to be sexually arousing?
Error! Main Document Only..
Is it arousing in a way that one’s local
community would consider unhealthy or immoral?
Error! Main Document Only..
Does it depict acts whose depictions are
specifically prohibited by state law?
Error! Main Document Only..
Does the work, when taken as a whole, lack
significant literary, artistic, scientific, or social value?
If the answer to all four questions is “yes,” the material will be judged obscene, and it will
be constitutional to prosecute someone for distributing it.
Mike Godwin, Virtual Community Standards: BBS Obscenity Case Raises New Legal Issues,
in HIGH NOON ON THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER, CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN CYBERSPACE 269, 271
(Peter Ludlow ed., 1996).
70
Miller, 413 U.S. at 32.
71
Id. at 37. For a discussion on the application of the community standard to the Internet,
see infra Part III.B.
72
390 U.S. 629 (1968). In Ginsberg, the Court found a minor’s constitutional right to
freedom of expression was not invaded by the New York statute which gave minors under age
seventeen more restricted rights than adults, as applied to what sexual material they could
see. Id. at 636-37. Specifically, the Court concluded that magazines with pictures of female
nudity are not obscene for adults, but are obscene as applied to minors under age seventeen.
Id. at 634-65.
73
Id. at 632. The defendant owned a lunch counter. Id. at 631. He personally sold two
“girlie” magazines to a 16 year-old boy. Id. The New York statute in question defined
“harmful to minors” as the
quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual
conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse, when it: (i) predominantly
appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and (ii) is patently
offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to
what is suitable material for minors, and (iii) is utterly without redeeming social
importance for minors.
Id. at 646 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h, later replace by §§ 235.20-235.22 (McKinney
1998)).
74
Id. at 640-41. The Court based its finding of a compelling interest on two reasons. Id. at
639. First, the Court found that parents have the authority in the household in our society
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material to children, even though it would not qualify as obscene when distributed to
adults.75 Although the protection of children qualifies as a compelling government
interest, a regulation designed to achieve this goal must be narrowly tailored or the least
restric tive means available to survive the strict scrutiny standard.76
2. Indecency Law
Short of obscenity, indecent speech is constitutionally protected, but it may be
regulated if the content is offensive to a compelling state interest.77 Indecent material
includes offensive sexual expression which is not obscene when distributed to adults, as
determined by the Miller obscenity test.78 The cornerstone case for the regulation of
indecent speech is FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 79 which involved a radio station
broadcast of comedian George Carlin’s monologue entitled “Filthy Words.”80 The FCC
concluded the language used in the broadcast was indecent and violated 18 U.S.C.
§1464,81 because certain words depicted excretory and sexual activities in an offensive
manner.82 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, found that the statutory terms
“obscene,” “indecent,” and “profane” had independent meanings.83 He went on to
adopt the FCC’s definition of the term “indecent.”84 The FCC defines broadcast
indecency as “language or material that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs.”85 The Court found that
and “are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility.” Id.
Second, it found “[t]he State also has an independent interest in the well-being of its youth.”
Id. at 640.
75
Id. at 638. But see Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (holding the State could
not totally suppress the material harmful to minors based on the state interest in protecting
children to such exposure because it would “reduce the adult population . . . to reading only
what is fit for children”).
76
See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (describing the strict scrutiny standard
and its application to content-based regulations); Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2344 (1997)
[hereinafter Reno II].
77
Recent Development, Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union: Supreme Court Strikes
Down Portions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 as Facially Overbroad in
Violation of the First Amendment, 24 J. CONTEMP. L. 111, 121 (1998) (discussing the
background of the First Amendment and finding free speech guarantees remain constant
even though communication mediums continually change).
78
Sable Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
79
438 U.S. 726 (1978).
80
Id. at 729-30.
81
The statute states, “[W]hoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by
means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. §1464 (1994).
82
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739.
83
Id. at 739-40.
84
Clapes, supra note 35, at 5 (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743, and discussing First
Amendment law terminology, including the history of the terms “indecent” and “patently
offensive,” and concluding because the Internet is so difficult to regulate through legislation,
the information technology industry needs to step forward and accept its responsibility to
protect children from the technology it brought into people’s homes).
85
Clapes, supra note 35, at 5 (quoting In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against
Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 8 F.C.C.R. 704, 705 n.10 (1993)).
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the FCC properly held the broadcast indecent and in violation of the statute because the
broadcast content was offensive and shocking.86
C. Medium-Specific First Amendment Analysis
The Court treats forms of communicative technology differently when applying First
Amendment standards because of the different characteristics of each medium.87 For
example, in Pacifica, the Court justified the application of a reduced level of scrutiny to
a radio broadcast due to distinct characteristics of the broadcast medium: (1) radio and
television are easily accessible by children; (2) broadcasting invades the privacy of
people’s homes and creates a constant risk of exposure to offensive broadcasts
(pervasive nature); and (3) the government must regulate the limited supply of
frequency space (scarcity of frequencies).88
The scarcity of frequencies argument originally surfaced in the case of Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 89 The Court concluded that because there are a limited
number of broadcasting frequencies, the government should manage them to best serve
86

Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 727.
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969). One example is print media,
where a print publisher may be a primary publisher and liable for the contents of its
publication, like a newspaper, if the publisher played a major part in creating and editing the
illegal communication. Campolo, supra note 11, at 747 (analogizing print publisher liability to
that of an electronic information service (EIS) or an Internet service provider and finding if the
EIS has reason to know the obscene or indecent material is posted on its service it is legally
obligated to remedy it). The alternative classification is that of a republisher where there is no
presumption of knowledge of the illegal material, like a bookstore. Id. Traditionally, print
media has been free from government regulation. The Message in the Medium: The First
Amendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062, 1071 (1994). In Smith
v. California, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of publisher liability and determined
that booksellers were republishers and could not be held strictly liable for the contents of the
published material they sold. 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959). Recently, some courts found Internet
service providers were republishers, while others classified them as primary publishers. E.g.
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding CompuServe’s
status was a republisher because it had no editorial control over material posted on its service
and because o f the infeasibility of examining all the material on its service); Stratton Oakmont,
Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995)
(holding Prodigy was a primary publisher responsible for member postings because Prodigy
held itself out as maintaining editorial control over material postings on its service, like a
newspaper); see generally Jennifer J. Lee, The Internet and First Amendment Values: Reno v.
ACLU and the Democratization of Speech in the Marketplace of Ideas, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L.
& A RTS 61 (1997) (finding the Internet is different from any traditional form of
communications media, but concluding the Internet is closest to telephone communication
because an Internet user must affirmatively search for information, like a caller placing a
telephone call).
88
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731 n.2; Recent Development, supra note 77, at 123 (describing the
Pacifica decision in which the Court upheld the FCC’s authority to sanction broadcasters for
transmitting indecent speech and finding broadcasting was “uniquely accessible to children,”
as well as a “uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans”).
89
395 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1969). In Red Lion, the Court held it was constitutional to regulate
broadcast media mo re strictly than other media because broadcast channels were a scarce
public resource. Id. The Court noted that the radio broadcast spectrum had become very
congested. Id. at 398. The government’s job was to properly allocate the scarce broadcast
frequencies so as to best serve the public interest. Id. at 396.
87
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the public interest.90 In sum, the government may not regulate the content of
objectionable material where individuals have control over its dissemination.91
The Court addressed the telephonic medium in Sable Communications, Inc. v.
FCC, 92 where a dial-a-porn service challenged § 223(b) of the 1988 version of the
Telecommunications Act, which banned the transmission of obscene or indecent
commercial phone recordings.93 The Supreme Court held that the portion of the statute
banning obscene communications was constitutional, as obscenity is not protected by
the First Amendment.94 However, the Court found that the “dial-it-medium” was less
pervasive than the broadcast medium in Pacifica because a caller must take affirmative
steps to receive a dial-a-porn message. 95 Therefore, in terms of the ban on indecent
communication, the Court analyzed telephonic communication under the strict scrutiny
standard.96 While the Court acknowledged that protecting the well-being of minors is a
compelling government interest, 97 it found that alternatives existed that were less
restrictive than a complete ban on indecent speech, which would deny adult access.98
The Supreme Court provided a lesser First Amendment protection to cable television
because, like broadcasts, cable is accessible to children and has a potentially pervasive
presence in a viewer’s home. 99 However, in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
90

Id. at 400. The right at issue was that of the viewers or listeners and not the
broadcasters. Id. at 390.
91
Reno II, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2343 (1997); Sean Adam Shiff, Comment, The Good, the Bad
and the Ugly: Criminal Liability for Obscene and Indecent Speech on the Internet, 22 WM.
M ITCHELL L. R. 731, 753 (1996) (arguing the Court should re-examine the Miller obscenity
standard and allow obscenity to receive First Amendment protection and only be suppressed
when the government has a compelling interest to do so). The author argued:
[T]he ultimate issue for sexually-explicit content on the Internet would be whether
users could adequately control the content appearing on their screen, as well as
what their children could access. If technology advances to the point where
exposure to all unwanted material could be thwarted, then the government would no
longer have a compelling interest in suppression.
Id. at 765.
92
492 U.S. 115 (1989). In Sable, the Court struck down a statute designed to prohibit
minors from accessing telephone dial-a-porn because the statute was not narrowly tailored to
meet the government purpose of protecting minors. Id. at 130-31.
93
47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1982); Sable, 492 U.S. at 117-19. A dial-a-porn service is where
individuals use the telephone to access and listen to obscene or indecent recordings for a fee.
Id. at 118; Congress began to regulate dial-a-porn in the 1980’s in an attempt to protect
children from the harmful effects of pornography. Wu, supra note 13, at 280.
94
Sable, 492 U.S. at 124. The Court held that it was a constitutional violation to deny
adult access to indecent communication over the telephone. Id. at 131.
95
Id. at 127-28.
96
Id. at 126. The Court found “sexual expression” that is indecent, but not obscene, is
protected by the First Amendment. Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 131. “The Government may . . . regulate the content of constitutionally protected
speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to
further the articulated interest.” Id. at 126.
99
Werst, supra note 31, at 221; Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,
518 U.S. 727, 745, 2386-87 (1996) (holding cable television is as pervasive and accessible to
children as broadcast media). But see Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1420 (11th Cir. 1985)
(holding cable television is not pervasive because individuals decide whether to have cable
installed in their homes and noting that parents may obtain lockboxes from their cable
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FCC, 100 the Court found that the Red Lion “scarcity of frequency” rationale did not
apply to cable television, and the Court affirmed the application of strict scrutiny or
something very close to strict scrutiny for content-based government regulations.101
Later, in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,102
the Court struck down two provisions of the 1992 Cable Act, that imposed heavy
regulations on the cable industry.103 One provision of the 1992 Cable Act allowed cable
services the power to prohibit indecent programs on public channels.104 The other
provision was the “segregate and block” provision which the Court found violated the
First Amendment because it allowed cable services to regulate the content of their
service. 105 The holding reflects the view that the First Amendment is consistent with
the promotion of diversity of speech.106
D. The Communications Decency Act of 1996: The First Round
1. Legislative History
Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to encourage development
and reduce regulation of new telecommunications technologies.107 Title V of this Act
includes the Communications Decency Act (CDA),108 which was an amendment
proposed by Senator James Exon (D-Neb.) in an effort to make the Internet
“superhighway a safe place for our children and our families to travel on.”109
company to prohibit child access to certain channels); Reno I, 929 F. Supp. 824, 876 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (Dalzell, J.,) aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Dawn L. Johnson, It’s 1996: Do You Know Where
Your Cyberkids Are? Captive Audiences and Content Regulation on the Internet, 15 J.
M ARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 51, 68 (1996).
100
512 U.S. 622 (1994), aff’d, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). In Turner, a group of cable operators
challenged the 1992 Cable Act. Id. at 634. The Act imposed rate regulations, must-carry
provisions, and restrictions on the distribution of indecent programs. Wu, supra note 13, at
278 (discussing the regulation within the cable industry and how the 1992 Cable Act
converted the cable industry from virtually unregulated to heavily regulated). The Court held
the must-carry provisions supported the important governmental interest of making free
television available and guaranteeing that a key part of the United States’ communication
system remains intact. Turner, 512 U.S. at 646-47.
101
Turner, 512 U.S. at 637-38, 641-42; The Court ultimately applied intermediate scrutiny in
Turner because it determined the provisions in question were content-neutral. Id. at 661-62.
102
518 U.S. 727 (1996).
103
Id. at 733 (citing Cable Televis ion Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-555 (1994)).
104
Id. at 732; see also Wu, supra note 13, at 276-80 (noting cable television is like
broadcasting in that the transmission is one-way, but unlike broadcasting because cable
subscribers may select a particular cable plan to receive in their home, while with
broadcasting the viewer receives what the broadcaster transmits).
105
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc., 518 U.S. at 733; Wu, supra note 13, at
279.
106
Wu, supra note 13, at 279-80 (discussing the historical regulation of cable television
and concluding that regulation of the Internet will halt the free and effective exchange of
ideas for which the Internet was created).
107
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-641 (Supp. 1996)).
108
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (a)-(h) (Supp. 1996)).
109
141 CONG. REC. S8087-04 (June 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon); see also 141 CONG
REC. S1920 (Feb. 1, 1995) (introducing the CDA); 141 CONG. REC. S1820 (June 9, 1995); 141
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The explicit purpose of the CDA was to shield children from indecent material on the
Internet.110 The indecency portions of the Act made it a criminal violation to use a
computer to transmit any “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent
[communications], with [the] intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another
person.”111 It also criminalized the computer transmission of any obscene or indecent
communication if the party sending the material knew the recipient was under the age
of eighteen, regardless of whom initiated the communication.112
Next, the CDA made it a criminal violation to use a computer to transmit a
communication to a specific minor that depicted or described sexual or excretory
activities or organs in terms that are patently offensive according to contemporary
community standards, no matter whom initiated the communication,113 or to transmit
the communication in such a way that it would be accessible to anyone under eighteen
years old.114
2. A Challenge to the CDA
On February 8, 1996, President Clinton signed the Telecommunications Act into law
and on the same day various groups advocating the First Amendment right to free
speech moved for a temporary restraining order in the Federal District Court of the
Central District of Pennsylvania to enjoin enforcement of the indecency portion of the
CDA. 115 Proponents of the regulation, including the federal government and advocates
of family rights, argued that the law protected children from objectionable content being
readily available on-line. 116 Opponents, such as free speech advocates and the
computer technology industry, argued that any legislation restricting the content of the
Internet infringed upon adults’ right to free speech.117 The three-judge panel granted
CONG. REC. S8386-02 (June 14, 1995) (proposing two amendments to the proposed regulation).
110
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104 § 502, 110 Stat. 56. The CDA was
an update of the Communications Act of 1934, which regulated telephone technology. See 47
U.S.C. § 609 (Supp. 1996).
111
47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 1996).
112
§ 223(a)(1)(B).
113
§ 223(d)(1)(A).
114
§ 223(d)(1)(B).
115
Reno I, 929 F. Supp. 824, 826-27 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997); plaintiffs
included the American Civil Liberties Union, AIDS Education Global Information System,
Bibliobytes, Clarinet Communications Corp., Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility, Critical Path AIDS Project, Inc., Electronic Frontier Foundation, Electronic
Privacy Information Center, Human Rights Watch, Institute for Global Communications,
Journalism Education Association, National Writers Union, Queer Resources Directory, Stop
Prisoner Rape, Wildcat Press Inc., Declan McCullagh, John Troyer, Brock Meeks, Jonathan
Wallace, and Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. Id. at 827 n.2.
116
C. Richard Martin, Censorship in Cyberspace, 34 HOUS . LAW . 45, 47 (1996); see also
Brief filed by Dept. of Justice in ACLU v. Reno, in TAKING SIDES , CLASHING VIEWS ON
CONTROVERSIAL LEGAL ISSUES , 201, 201-04 (M. Ethan Katsh ed., 7th ed. 1996).
117
Werst, supra note 31, at 212; see generally Bret Alan Dublinske, Free Speech, the
Internet, and The CDA: Is a “Decent” Opinion Just a Dream?, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1229
(1997) (discussing the CDA and concluding it is unconstitutional because it impairs a
significant amount of constitutionally protected adult speech); Laura J. McKay, The
Communications Decency Act: Protecting Children From On-Line Indecency, 20 SETON
HALL LEGIS . J. 463 (1996) (discussing the CDA and its First Amendment issues).
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the order, finding the provisions in question were unconstitutional because they were
overbroad and vague in the use of the terms “indecent” and “patently offensive.”118
3. The United States Supreme Court Decision
In Reno v. ACLU, 119 the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s holding in a 72 decision and invalidated the CDA indecency provisions of 47 U.S.C. §223(a) and
223(d).120 The Court found that the statute lacked the precision required under the
First Amendment to regulate speech content.121 The decision also affirmed the district
court’s holding of vagueness and overbreadth.122
The government argued that the CDA was constitutional, based on previous cases in
which the Court upheld government regulations designed to protect minors from speech
that was not obscene by adult standards.123 This line of precedent included Ginsberg v.
New York, 124 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 125 and City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters,
118

Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 855. The statute provided for review by a district court threejudge panel, with direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Werst, supra note 31, at 212. The
judges in the district court were Chief Judge Dolores K. Sloviter, Chief Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, District Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter and District
Judge Stewart Dalzell. Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 827.
119
117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
120
Id. at 2346-51. Justice Stevens delivered the Court’s opinion, joined by Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsberg and Breyer. Id. at 2333. Justice O’Connor, joined by
Chief Judge Rehnquist, wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id.; see
also Ian C. Ballon, Linking, Framing and Other Hot Topics in Internet Law and Litigation,
520 P.L.I/PAT 167, 299-302 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course
Handbook Series No. G0-0001, 1998) (listing the remaining constitutional provisions of the
CDA); see generally Nathan M. Semmel, Talking Back to Cyber-Mum: Challenging the
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS . 533 (1998) (concluding the
passing of the CDA showed a lack of confidence in American family values and finding it is
up to parents to choose what their children see and read); Al Harrison, Internet: Supreme
Court Holds That Communications Decency Act is Unconstitutional, 35-FEB HOUS. LAW. 44
(1998) (providing details of the Supreme Court decision in Reno II).
121
Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2346. The Court found that due to the vagueness of the CDA, it
silenced speech that would be otherwise entitled to constitutional protection. Id. According
to the Court:
[T]he CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a
constitutional right to receive and to address to one another. That burden on adult
speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in
achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve.
Id.
122
Id. at 2344-50. The Court agreed that due to the unique characteristics of the Internet,
previous Supreme Court opinions “provide no basis for qualifying the level of First
Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the internet].” Id. at 2344. The Court also
agreed the statute was similar to the Sable dial-a-porn ban. Id. at 2346. In Sable, the Court
made it clear that just because a regulation is passed to protect minors from harmful material
doesn’t end the inquiry as to whether the regulation is valid. Id.
123
Id. at 2341-43. In the government’s appeal it argued the district court erred in finding
the CDA was overbroad and in violation of the First Amendment and that the CDA was
vague and violated the First Amendment. Id. at 2341. The Supreme Court affirmed the district
court’s decision without reaching the Fifth Amendment inquiry. Id.
124
390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding statute prohibiting the sale to minors of material
otherwise available for sale to adults due to the state’s interest in the welfare of its children).
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Inc. 126 Justice Stevens declined to follow precedent and distinguished the Internet from
traditional broadcast media. 127
The Court went on to identify three important criteria to explain why the Internet
was subject to strict scrutiny, while broadcast media was subject to a lesser standard of
review:128
?

The Internet has no history of extensive government regulation.129

?

The Internet has no scarcity of available frequencies.130

?

The Internet does not “invade” an individual’s home. 131

In particular, the Court focused on the non-invasive nature of the Internet, as compared
to radio or television.132 The Court held that the CDA was similar to the case of Sable
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 133 where it struck down a ban on “dial-a-porn” services.
The Court likened the telephone used to access pornographic recordings to using a
computer to access pornography on the Internet, because both require “the listener to
take affirmative steps to receive the communication.”134
The Court held that the indecency provisions of the CDA were unconstitutionally
overbroad.135 Although the Court stated that protecting children from exposure to
sexually explicit material was a compelling governmental interest, it found that the CDA
125

438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding FCC restriction of radio broadcasts that it found
indecent, but not obscene, because the broadcast in question was aired in the afternoon with
children in the listening audience).
126
475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult theaters from
locating in residential areas).
127
Reno II, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2341-44 (1997). The Court determined the Ginsberg holding
was narrower than the CDA because the CDA took away parents’ ability to choose what
material was proper for their children. Id. at 2341. The Court determined the Pacifica case
involved broadcasting which received the least First Amendment protection due to its
scarcity of frequencies and invasive nature, while the Internet could not compare. Id.at 2342.
The Court distinguished Renton on the basis that the Internet does not have identifiable
boundaries like the zoning ordinance at issue in that case. Id.
128
Gary D. Allison, The Cyberwar of 1997: Timidity and Sophistry at the First
Amendment Front, 33 TULSA L.J. 103, 115 (1997) (summarizing the differences between the
Internet and broadcasting media as found by the Supreme Court in Reno II).
129
Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2343 (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 397-400
(1969)). The Court noted the Internet has never been subject to government regulation,
unlike traditional broadcast media. Id.
130
Id. (citing Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)). The Court found that
because over 40 million users across the world have the capacity to access the Internet at a
low cost, the medium does not have scarce operating resources. Id. at 2344.
131
Id. at 2343 (citing Sable Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989). The Court found a
user must take “affirmative steps” to access pornography on the Internet. Id.
132
Reno II, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2343-44 (1997) (agreeing with the district court’s finding that
Internet communications do not invade the user’s home).
133
Sable, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989).
134
Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2343 (quoting Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28). “Placing a telephone call
[or retrieval of information from the Internet] is not the same as turning on a radio and being
taken by surprise by an indecent message.” Id. (quoting Sable, 492 U.S. at 128).
135
Id. at 2343 (citing Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28).
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suppressed an unacceptable amount of constitutionally protected speech for adults.136
Since the Internet is open to anyone, regardless of age, the Court found that under the
Act, adults had no feasible method to engage in constitutionally protected indecent
speech.137 As a result, the unprecedented breadth of the CDA imposed a heavy burden
on the government to explain why a less restrictive alternative would not be acceptable,
a burden the government could not overcome. 138
Beyond the overbreadth issue, the Court invalidated the CDA’s indecency provisions
on grounds of vagueness.139 Under the void for vagueness doctrine, a law is void on its
face if individuals of “common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application.”140 The Court found that the failure of the statute to define
the terms “indecent” and “patently offensive” left speakers uncertain as to what the
terms meant, which resulted in a chilling effect on free speech.141 Additionally, the
Court held the statute needed to include all three prongs of the Miller standard, rather
than just one, to avoid vagueness.142 Consequently, the majority concluded that the
CDA “amounted to ‘burn[ing] the house to roast the pig.’”143 The ruling makes it clear
that statutes that attempt to regulate content on the Internet must meet the highest level
of scrutiny.144
E. Legislative Tools in Place to Regulate Obscenity
The existing federal obscenity statute has been successfully applied to the
Internet.145 Those sections which may be applicable to the Internet are as follows: 18
U.S.C. § 1460 makes it a crime to possess obscene material with the intent to
136

Id. at 2346.
Id. at 2349-50.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 2344-46.
140
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
141
Reno II, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2344 (1997).
142
Id. at 2345. The Court found the third prong of the Miller test was extremely important
because it set a national floor as to what constitutes artistic, political, literary, or scientific
value. Id. The Court felt this was important because the first two prongs of the test are
judged by only local opinion, so each state can assert its values as to what is obscene. Id.
Consequently, the majority held the CDA’s use of the terms “indecent” and “patently
offensive” undermined the goal to establish a uniform national standard for regulation of
Internet speech. Id. at 2344-45 and n.39.
143
Id. at 2350 (citing Sable Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127 (1989)). The Court went
on to find “[t]he CDA, casting a far darker shadow over free speech, threatens to torch a large
segment of the Internet community.” Id.
144
Kim L. Rappaport, Note & Comment, In the Wake of Reno v. ACLU: The Continued
Struggle in Western Constitutional Democracies with Internet Censorship and Freedom of
Speech Online, 13 A M U. INT’L L. REV. 765, 784 (1998) (reviewing freedom of speech on the
Internet, along with proposed legislation in the United States and Germany, and concluding
technological solutions to control Internet content are just as restrictive of free speech as
government interference because technology uses private parties to do the censoring the
government would have done); see generally John J. Mcguire, The Sword of Damocles is Not
Narrow Tailoring: The First Amendment’s Victory in Reno v. ACLU, 48 CASEW. RES. L. REV.
413 (1998) (arguing the Court should continue to fully protect the Internet due to the free and
diverse forum of communication it offers).
145
18 U.S.C. §§ 1460-69 (1994 & Supp. 1997); see also Goldman, supra note 12, at 1108-11
(describing current federal anti-pornography statutes and determining the statutes are
medium-related and are not clearly applicable to the Internet).
137

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1999

17

Akron Law Review, Vol. 32 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 2

AKRON LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 32:2
distribute, 146 while 18 U.S.C. § 1462 makes it a crime to distribute or receive obscene
materials through a common carrier in interstate or foreign commerce. 147 18 U.S.C. §
1464 prohibits broadcasting “obscene, indecent, or profane language.”148 Finally, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1465 and 1466 prohibit one from knowingly transporting or engaging in the
business of selling obscene, lewd or filthy material through interstate commerce. 149
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals successfully applied 18 U.S.C. § 1465 in United
States v. Thomas, 150 the first Internet obscenity case tried.151 There, the court
determined that using a computer to transmit pornographic material violated 18 U.S.C. §
1465.152
Finally, another federal anti-obscenity law is the Child Pornography Act (CPA),
which prior to September 30, 1996 provided:
anyone who knowingly ships, distributes, or receives . . . ‘by any means including
computer,’ or knowingly possesses, three or more copies of, any visual depiction of
sexually explicit conduct produced by means involving the use of a minor engaging
in such conduct, is guilty of a felony punishable by up to ten years in prison . . . .153

The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) amended and broadened the
CPA by prohibiting the production and distribution of computer-generated or other
mechanically altered images of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.154
146

18 U.S.C. §1460 (1994); The text of this statute states, in part:
Whoever . . . in the . . . territorial jurisdiction of the United States, . . . knowingly sells
or possesses with intent to sell an obscene visual depiction shall be punished by a
fine in accordance with the provisions of this title or imprisoned for not more than 2
years, or both.

Id.
147

18 U.S.C. §1462 (1994 & Supp. 1997); see also Goldman, supra note 12, at 1109 (noting
that among the current anti-obscenity laws, Section 1462 is the most applicable to the Internet
because an Internet service provider is analogous to a common carrier and thus falls within
the provisions of Section 1462).
148
18 U.S.C. §1464 (1994). The statute states “[w]hoever utters any obscene, indecent, or
profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.” Id.; see generally Charles D. Ferris and
Terrence J. Leahy, Red Lions, Tigers and Bears; Broadcast Content Regulation and the First
Amendment, 38 CATH. U.L. REV. 299 (1989) (arguing that broadcast content requires a limited
amount of government oversight).
149
18 U.S.C. §§1465-1466 (1994 & Supp. 1997); for the text of 18 U.S.C. §1465, see infra
note 246; 18 U.S.C. 1466 states, in part:
Whoever is engaged in the business of selling or transferring obscene matter, who
knowingly receives or possesses with intent to distribute any obscene book,
magazine, picture, paper, film, videotape, or phonograph or other audio recording,
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, shall be
punished by imprisonment for not more than 5 years or by a fine under this title, or
both.
18 U.S.C. § 1466 (1994).
150
74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
151
For further discussion on the Thomas case, see infra notes 245-48 and accompanying
text.
152
Thomas, 74 F.3d at 707-08.
153
Clapes, supra note 35, at 7-8 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1461, 1463, 1464, 1468).
154
18 U.S.C. § 2252A (Supp. 1997); Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub.
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Recently, the First Circuit Court of Appeals successfully applied this statute in United
States v. Carroll, 155 which involved the distribution of child pornography on the
Internet.156 There, the court determined that Internet distribution was the same as
transportation in interstate commerce. 157
F.

Child Online Protection Act (COPA): The Second Round

The Child Online Protection Act (COPA) is Congress’ second attempt at restricting
Internet content. President Bill Clinton signed COPA into law on October 21, 1998.158
Less than twenty-four hours later, the same groups who challenged the CDA in 1996159
challenged COPA as unconstitutional claiming it is overbroad and threatens adult access
to legitimate, constitutionally protected material. 160 On November 19, 1998, the United
L. No. 104-208, Title I, §121(3a); 110 Stat. 3009-28 (amending 18 U.S.C. §§2241, 2243, 2251,
2252, 2256, 42 U.S.C. §2000aa, and adding 18 U.S.C. §2252A); see also David J. Loundy, Who
Hasn’t Noticed? Child Porn Already Illegal, CHI. DAILY L. BULL. , May 14, 1998, at 6 (arguing
the CPPA is unnecessary Internet legislation because existing child pornography laws work
to prevent harm caused by the distribution of the material online; no child is harmed in the
creation of synthetic porn prohibited by the CPPA); see generally Sheri A. Dillon, Douglas E.
Groene, et. al., Computer Crimes, 35 A M. CRIM. L. REV. 503, 518-19 (1998) (summarizing the
CPPA); Debra D. Burke, The Criminalization of Virtual Child Pornography: A
Constitutional Question, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS . 439 (1997); Jennifer Stewart, If This is the
Global Community, We Must Be On The Bad Side of Town: International Policing of Child
Pornography on the Internet, 20 HOUS . J. INT’L L. 205 (1997).
155
105 F.3d 740 (1st Cir. 1997).
156
For further discussion on the Carroll case, see infra notes 249-252 and accompanying
text.
157
Carrol, 105 F.3d at 742.
158
See, e.g., Channel 2000 - ACLU Fights New ‘Net Restrictions (visited Oct. 23, 1998)
<http://www.cbs2.com/ news/stories/news-981022-053838.html>; Dan Robrish, ACLU Files
Suit
vs.
Internet
Law
(visited
Oct.
23,
1998)
<http://dailynews.yahoo.com/headlines/ap/technology/story.html?s=v/ap/19981022/tc/intern
et_decency_l.html>; Representative Mike Oxley (R-Ohio) authored the new law. See, e.g.,
David Walsh, World Socialist Web Site, US Group Sues Over Attempt at Internet Censorship
(visited Nov. 1, 1998) <http://www.wsws.org/ news/1998/oct1998/ net-024.shtml>. The
Clinton administration raised objections to the bill based on an analysis by the United States
Justice Department concluding it was probably unconstitutional. Id. However, Oxley
pressured the White House by stating to reporters, in reference to the Monica Lewinsky
investigation, “Here’s a chance for the White House to lead . . . [and] regain its moral
compass. I sincerely hope they join us in trying to lift this country up.” Frank James,
Internet Anti-Smut Law Challenged as Unconstitutional, CHI. TRIB ., Oct. 23, 1998, at 3.
159
The 17 plaintiffs include the American Civil Liberties Union (on behalf of all its
members), The American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression, A Different Light
Bookstore, ArtNet, The Blackstripe, Electronic Frontier Foundation (on behalf of all its
members), Condomania, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Free Speech Media, LLC,
Internet Content Coalition (whose members include CBS New Media, The New York Times
Electronic Media Company, Time Inc., C/Net, Warner Bros. Online, Playboy Enterprises,
MSNBC, Sony Online and ZDNet), OBGYN.NET, PlanetOut Corporation, Philadelphia Gay
News, Powell’s bookstore, RIOTGRRL, Salon Magazine, and Weststock.com. American Civil
Liberties Union Freedom Network: ACLU v. Reno, Round 2: Broad Coalition Files
Challenge to New Federal Net Censorship Law (visited Nov. 9, 1998)
<http://www.aclu.org/features /f1101698a. html> [hereinafter Round 2].
160
The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court in Pennsylvania requesting a
preliminary injunction to block the enforcement of the law. Walsh, supra note 158.
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States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted a motion for a
temporary restraining order and halted enforcement of COPA until a court resolves its
constitutionality.161 On February 1, 1999, the judge issued a preliminary injunction
blocking enforcement of the law, finding it threatened the right to free speech.162
Congress’ explicit purpose and alleged compelling government interest in passing the
new law was to protect children from harmful material on the web while preserving
adults’ First Amendment rights.163 The main difference between the new law and the
CDA is that COPA purports to apply only to commercial web sites, and it embodies a
“harmful to minors” standard rather than the obscenity standard of the CDA. 164
COPA makes it a federal crime to knowingly make “any communication for
commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that includes any material that is
harmful to minors.”165 The Act provides affirmative defenses to liability if commercial
adult web site operators block minors from accessing material deemed “harmful to
minors” on their sites.166 Actions that a content provider could take include “requiring
According to Ann Beeson, attorney for the ACLU, “This law, just like Congress’ first attempt
to regulate speech on the Internet, makes it a crime for adults to communicate and receive
information on the Web that is clearly constitutionally protected.” Elizabeth Weise, First
Federal Net Privacy Law Approved, USA TODAY, Oct. 22, 1998, at D1.
161
American Civil Liberties Union Freedom Network, Judge Halts Enforcement of Internet
Censorship Law (Nov. 19, 1998) <http://www.aclu.org/features/f101698a.html>; American
Civil Liberties Union Freedom Network, Temporary Restraining Order Memorandum in
ACLU v. Reno II (visited Nov. 20, 1998) <http://www.aclu.org/court/ acluvrenoII_tro.html>.
Judge Lowell A. Reed, Jr. found the plaintiffs established a likelihood of success on the claim
that COPA violates adults’ First Amendment rights. Id. He found the plaintiffs raised
“serious and substantial questions as to the technological and economic feasibility of these
affirmative defenses.” Id.
162
Miller, supra note 3, at 01A. United States District Judge Lowell Reed posted the
decision on the internet at www.paed.uscourts.gov, the court’s web site. He wrote, “[i]ndeed,
perhaps we do the minors of this country harm if the First Amendment protections, which
they will with age inherit fully, are chipped away in the name of protection.” Id. Government
lawyers must now decide whether to ask for a full trial before Judge Reed, appeal the decision,
or allow it to stand. Id.
163
H.R. Rep. No. 105-775, at 5 (1998).
164
Walsh, supra note 158; 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1)(1998); COPA states:
‘material that is harmful to minors’ means any communication, picture, image,
graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or other matter of any kind that is
obscene or that(Error! Main Document Only.)
the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, would find, taking the material as a whole and with
respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the
prurient interest;
(Error! Main Document Only.)
depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner
patently offensive with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or
sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd
exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breasts; and
(Error! Main Document Only.)
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value for minors.
47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)(1998).
165
§ 231(a)(1).
166
§ 231(c)(1) (specifying the affirmative defenses to the Act); see also James, supra note
158.
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use of a credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification
number,”167 “accepting a digital certificate that verifies age,”168 or “any other
reasonable measures”169 prior to allowing users to view the web site content. Penalties
for not implementing such measures include fines of up to $50,000 for each day in
violation and up to six months in prison.170 The government may also bring a civil suit
against individuals with a penalty of up to $50,000 for each violation.171
III. ANALYSIS
A.

The COPA is Unconstitutional

Like the CDA, the effect of COPA is that it criminalizes constitutionally protected
adult speech and “reduces the Internet to what is fit for a six-year-old.”172 Congress
claims COPA applies only to commercial web transactions which display material that is
harmful to minors, and not to non-commercial activities.173 However, the law actually
bans a wide range of protected speech that is provided without a fee by individuals who
also happen to be communicating for other commercial purposes.174 In order to fully
understand this idea, one must carefully examine the Act’s broad definition of
“commercial purposes.”175 It states that a person makes a communication for
commercial purposes if he “is engaged in the business of making such
communications.”176 The Act’s definition of “engaged in the business” states “it is not
necessary that the person make a profit . . . [nor] that the making . . . [of] such
communications be the person’s . . . principal business.”177
Many content providers carry material that relates to sex and allow users to access
their content for free, while attempting to make a profit by means other than selling the
material, such as in the following situations:
167

47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)(A)(1998); see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-775, at 14 (1998). In order to
obtain a personal identification number (PIN) for access to an adult site, the consumer clicks
on a link to the age verification system used by the site. Id. Consumers may instantly receive
a PIN by submitting an application to the system with credit card information. Id. If the
information is verified, a PIN number is issued. Id. The verification generally takes five to ten
seconds. Id.
168
47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)(B) (1998).
169
§ 231(c)(1)(C).
170
§ 231(a)(1); § 231(a)(2).
171
§ 231(a)(3). In sum, “if you’re supplying smut, you must set up an age verification
process . . . if you don’t, you’ll face a $50,000 fine and six months in jail.” Sequel, supra note
1.
172
Round 2, supra note 159 (quoting ACLU attorney, Ann Beeson). “Whether you call it
the ‘Communications Decency Act’ or the ‘Congress Doesn’t Understand the Internet Act,’ it
is still unconstitutional . . .” Id.; see, e.g., Walsh, supra note 158.
173
H.R. Rep. No. 105-775, at 12 (1998) (stating COPA applies only to commercial web
transactions which contain material harmful to minors and it does not prohibit non-commercial
activities).
174
Round 2, supra note 159; American Civil Liberties Union Freedom Network, ACLU v.
Reno Complaint for Declatory and Injunctive Relief, (visited Nov. 9, 1998)
<http://www.aclu.org/court/ acluvrenoII_complaint. html> [hereinafter ACLU Complaint].
Providers who sell content on their web sites that is harmful to minors are exempt from the
Act when the purchaser pays with a debit or credit card. 47 U.S.C. §231(c) (1998).
175
§ 231(e)(2)(A).
176
Id.
177
§ 231(e)(2)(B).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1999

21

Akron Law Review, Vol. 32 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 2

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:2

?

A web publisher which attempts to make a profit through advertising, just
like a traditional newspaper or magazine;

?

An online music store or art store which allows users to browse their
content for free, like browsing in an ordinary bookstore or art gallery; or

?

A content provider who attempts to make a profit by charging
contributors, but gives users free access.178

According to the Act’s “commercial purposes” definition, these “commercial” content
providers would be forced to implement a means to restrict access by minors, even
though their material is non-commercial. 179 Therefore, COPA does not prohibit only
the sale of material harmful to minors, it actually restricts non-commercial speech as
well. 180 This is the same overbreadth characteristic that the Supreme Court struck
down in the CDA in Reno v. ACLU I. 181 Additionally, requiring content providers to
obtain a credit card number from a user “essentially forces free speech to become
commercial speech in order to remain legal.”182 If an adult user does not have a credit
card, he cannot read constitutionally protected material. 183
178

ACLU Complaint, supra note 174 (providing these examples to support its argument
that COPA bans constitutionally protected speech that various individuals and organizations
provide for free, including the web content provided by popular magazines and news web
sites).
179
The Starr Report is an example of free content which would be illegal under COPA.
Sequel, supra note 1. Many of the online content providers that carry the document are news
web sites which make profits by charging contributors or advertisers, but users access their
sites for free. ACLU Complaint, supra note 174. However, due to the graphic sexual details
contained in the Starr Report, it would be illegal for these news sites to carry the report.
James, supra note 158. According to Mark Segal, editor of the Philadelphia Gay News,
We once published in newspapers in Philadelphia and on web sites, (former
Surgeon General) C. Everett Koop’s complete report on AIDS. If this law was active
at that time, those of us who published that could go to jail . . . [the law] is lifethreatening [because banned web site information could save lives].
Walsh, supra note 158.
180
Department of Justice Letter on CDA II (visited Oct. 23, 1998)
<http://www.aclu.org/court/acluvrenoII_doj_ letter.html> [hereinafter DOJ Letter] (discussing
COPA and its many ambiguities in the scope of its coverage, and finding it is evidence that
the Act is not narrowly tailored as required by the strict scrutiny standard for the Internet).
181
117 S. Ct. 2329, 2347. The Court stated that:
The breadth of the CDA’s coverage is wholly unprecedented. Unlike the
regulations upheld in Ginsberg and Pacifica, the scope of the CDA is not limited to
commercial speech or commercial entities. Its open-ended prohibitions embrace all
nonprofit entities and individuals posting indecent messages or displaying them . . .
in the presence of minors.
Id.; Despite lawmakers’ claim that the new bill is narrowly tailored to apply only to minors,
ACLU Staff Attorney Ann Beeson said that the constitutional flaws in this law are identical to
the flaws that led the Supreme Court to strike down the CDA. Walsh, supra note 158. But see
H.R. Rep. No. 105-775, at 13 (1998) (stating Congress’ view that COPA is limited to commercial
transactions as required by Reno II).
182
Joe Nickell, Government Sued Over Online Anti-Porn Law (visited Oct. 23, 1998)
<http://dailynews.yahoo. com/headlines/wr/story.html?s-v/hm/19981022/wr/speech_l.html>
(summarizing the argument of Stanton McCandlish, program director for the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, a co-plaintiff in the current suit). Additionally, “[t]hose of us who have
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Although the Act provides affirmative defenses to liability, none of them are
technologically or economically achievable for providers of free web content.184 The
credit or debit card option is unavailable to free content providers because financial
institutions will not verify them without a financial transaction.185 Adult identification
systems may currently be used by some commercial distributors of adult content,186
but it is technologically and economically unavailable to providers who provide their
content for free. 187 Because free Internet content is available to all users, regardless of
age, and there are no reasonable means for free content providers to verify users’ age,
these providers are only left with the options of making speech available to all users or
to none. 188
Further evidence of the unconstitutionality of COPA is found in an analysis of the bill
written by the United States Justice Department which was sent to Congress on
October 5, 1998, sixteen days before President Clinton signed COPA into law.189 In
credit cards have another problem. Is there anybody in the world we want to possess our
credit card numbers less than commercial porno peddlers?” Aaron Myers, A Bad Idea Gets
Even Worse, THE BROOKINGS REGISTER, Oct. 29, 1998, at A4.
183
Nickell, supra note 182 (quoting Stanton McCandlish, program director for the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, a co-plaintiff in the current suit).
184
ACLU Complaint, supra note 174 (finding 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)(A) is the same as a
CDA defense the Court found unavailable to content providers in Reno I). It is an affirmative
defense under COPA if a content provider that carries material that is harmful to minors has
restricted access by minors “(A) by requiring use of a credit card, debit account, adult access
code, or adult personal identification number; (B) by accepting a digital certificate that verifies
age; or (C) by any other reasonable measures that are feasible under available technology.”
47 U.S.C. §231(c)(1)(1998).
185
ACLU Complaint, supra note 174. The ACLU believes there are no reasonable means,
given available technology, for free content providers to restrict access by minors. Id.
186
H.R. Rep. No. 105-775, at 14 (1998) (finding the use of the various forms of age
verification prescribed in the Act are standard practice among some commercial pornography
distributors on the web). According to Congress:
It is not only economically feasible for commercial content providers to comply with
the bill, but profitable for them to do so. . . . Given that the scope of the bill is limited
to commercial activity, and that the age verification system procedures prescribed
under the bill represent standard procedures for conducting commercial activity on
pornographic Web sites, the effect of the bill is simply to . . . require age verification
before pornography is made available . . . .
Id.
187
ACLU Complaint, supra note 174. The ACLU states in its recent complaint:
Even if age or credit card verification were technologically or economically feasible,
such requirements would fundamentally alter the nature and values of the new
computer communication medium, which is characterized by spontaneous,
instantaneous, albeit often unpredictable, communication by hundreds of
thousands of individual speakers around the globe, and which provides an
affordable and often seamless means of accessing an enormous and diverse body of
information, ideas and viewpoints. Pre-registration or screening requirements would
undermine the unique characteristics of this new technology.
Id.
188
Id. On its face, the Act applies to adult communications because all free web content
is available to both minors and adults. Id.
189
DOJ Letter, supra note 180. Acting Assistant Attorney General L. Anthony Sutin sent
the letter to Representative Thomas Bliley (R-Va.), chairman of the House Commerce
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that analysis the Justice Department said the bill suffered from serious constitutional
problems and found it would not be wise to divert resources away from more important
initiatives, such as combating online traffickers of hard-core child pornography and
predators of children.190 Constitutional problems noted in the analysis include
numerous ambiguities with regard to the scope of its coverage. 191 The Justice
Department found the presence of such ambiguity undermines “the likelihood that the
[bill] has been carefully tailored to the congressional goal of protecting minors from
potentially harmful materials.”192 According to the Justice Department, one of the
“troubling ambiguities” involves the breadth and clarity of the three part “harmful to
minors” standard.193 It found the standard was unclear, particularly because the first
prong is ambiguous as to which “contemporary community standard” would be
dispositive. 194
The Justice Department also found that it is uncertain whether the Act will limit
access by minors to harmful materials, as children still would be able to access
pornography from alternative sources, including chat rooms.195 Further, the Internet is
global in nature and all web content, regardless of origin, is available to all users
worldwide. 196 Therefore, children have access to an infinite amount of overseas web
sites. Because 40% of web content originates overseas and cannot be regulated by
Committee. James, supra note 158.
190
DOJ Letter, supra note 180. The Department of Justice currently devotes a large
amount of resources to the “Innocent Images” FBI undercover operation which started in
1995. Id. Through this operation, agents and officers go online to track individuals who are
victimizing children. Id. To date, the initiative has obtained 196 indictments, 202 arrests, 207
convictions, and 456 evidentiary searches were carried out. Id.; see generally Marc D.
Goodman, Why The Police Don’t Care About Computer Crime, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 465
(1997).
191
DOJ Letter, supra note 180.
192
Id. (quoting, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2344 (1997)). The analysis predicted that COPA would be
challenged on constitutional grounds because it is a “content-based restriction applicable to
‘the vast democratic form of the Internet.’ ” Id. (quoting Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2329, 2343,
2351); There are many more effective alternative means to assist parents in limiting their
children’s access to harmful material, including special software applications. Id.
193
DOJ Letter, supra note 180. COPA partially defines material that is “harmful to minors”
as material “the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find,
taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is
designed to pander to, the prurient interest.” 47 U.S.C. §231(e)(6)(A) (1998) (stating the first
prong of a three-part test).
194
DOJ Letter, supra note 180. The Justice Department’s analysis asks:
Which “contemporary community standards” would be dispositive? Those of the
judicial district (or some other geographical “community”) in which the expression is
“posted”? Of the district or local community in which the jury sits? Of some
“community” in cyberspace? Some other “community”? Resolution of this question
might well affect the statute’s constitutionality.
Id.; see also infra Section III.B.
195
DOJ Letter, supra note 180. The DOJ found COPA does not address those other
sources of Internet material that is harmful to minors. Id. Practically and legally it would be
difficult to regulate web sites overseas due to the serious questions of “extraterritorial
enforcement.” Id.
196
ACLU Complaint, supra note 174 (finding the government cannot show COPA will
reduce minors’ access to material that is harmful to minors because of the global nature of the
Internet).
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Unites States law, the Act will not meet its purpose of protecting children from sexually
oriented web content.197
B. The Community Standard and COPA
The COPA criteria for “material that is harmful to minors” embodies the community
standard guideline established in Miller v. California. 198 The community standard
leaves it up to jurors in the local community to decide what is obscene under the
obscenity standard or, in the alternative, what is harmful to minors under COPA’s
“harmful to minors” standard.199
The community standard is extremely difficult to apply to the Internet because the
Internet’s reach is worldwide. 200 When someone in a country with a conservative
community standard receives sexually explicit material via the Internet from a country
that permits and encourages bigamy or nudity, for example, it becomes difficult to
determine which community standard should govern.201 For this reason, never has a
community been so difficult to define as that of the Internet.202
Because the Internet is a global medium, COPA’s mandated application of the
community standard to the Internet creates a national or international community
standard where the standard of the nation or the world as a whole determines what is
harmful to minors.203 Originally, Justices Harlan and Brennan advanced the idea of a
197

Id. It is not possible to block overseas content from entering the United States and
users may access content from overseas just as easily as content which originates from local
sources. Id. Therefore, the Act will not accomplish its goal of protecting children from web
material that is harmful to minors. Id.
198
413 U.S. 15 (1973). The first of the three criteria in the COPA “harmful to minors”
standard includes “the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would
find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is
designed to pander to, the prurient interest.” 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)(A)(1998) (emphasis
added).
199
Miller, 413 U.S. at 30; see also 47 U.S.C. §231(e)(6) (1998).
200
Handelman, supra note 10, at 731; see also Todd H. Flaming, The Rules of Cyberspace:
Informal Law in a New Jurisdiction, 85 ILL. B.J. 174, 178 (1997) (discussing the application of
local law to cyberspace and finding the application difficult because cyberspace crosses
international and local jurisdictional and geographical boundaries).
201
Pollack, supra note 38, at 472; see generally Dawn A. Edick, Regulation of
Pornography on the Internet in the United States and the United Kingdom: A Comparative
Analysis, 21 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 437 (1998) (concluding the United Kingdom’s
program of self-regulation is preferable to the United States’ federal legislation because
federal legislation represses freedom of speech); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet as a Threat
to Sovereignty? Thoughts on the Internet’s Role in Strengthening National And Global
Governance, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 423, 424 (1998) (finding the Internet will strengthen
global governance and cooperation by “(1) strengthening international law; (2) strengthening
economic interdependence; (3) empowering non-governmental organizations and improving
their abilities to contribute productively to the development of international regimes designed
to deal with global problems; and (4) supporting international security mechanisms”).
202
Gobla, supra note 8, at 122; see generally Susan J. Drucker, The Tenets of Jurisdiction:
Lost in Cyberspace?, 69 N.Y. ST . B.J. 30 (December, 1997) (concluding international
agreements are the answer to Internet content issues due to the Internet’s global reach).
203
According to David Sobel, general counsel for the Electronic Privacy Information
Center and plaintiff co-counsel, “There is a very real problem with applying a highly
subjective standard, the ‘harmful to minors’ standard, which has traditionally been applied at
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national standard in two plurality opinions of Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day204 and
Jacobellis v. Ohio. 205 Subsequently, the Court rejected the concept in Miller due to its
unmanageability.206 Because various communities in the world differ in their tolerance
of sexually oriented material, an international standard will impose the standards of one
community upon the rest of the world.207 A permissive community will force less
tolerant communities to accept material they deem offensive and likewise, the standard
of a restrictive community will prevent tolerant communities from accessing materials
they would otherwise accept.208
To overcome this problem, some have suggested that Congress apply the Miller
community standard to the virtual community or the community of users online,
regardless of geographic location.209 The argument concludes that while a user is online, he is part of a virtual community and is governed by its standards.210 Advocates
the local level, to a global medium.” Nickell, supra note 182. Compare Godwin, supra note
69, at 272-73 (suggesting courts should abandon the community standard guideline
altogether, due to the chilling effect of users having to censor themselves to avoid being
prosecuted under another community’s standard).
204
370 U.S. 478 (1962). Justice Harlan analyzed the Roth standard and determined it
included a national community standard. Id. at 488. He concluded a local standard would
result in “the intolerable consequence of denying some sections of the country access to
material, there deemed acceptable, which in others might be considered offensive to
prevailing community standards of decency.” Id.
205
378 U.S. 184 (1964). Justice Brennan concluded a local community standard would be
unconstitutional because it could not “properly be employed in delineating the area of
expression that is protected by the Federal Constitution.” Id. at 193. He felt a local
community standard would limit First Amendment rights. Id. at 194.
206
Stepka, supra note 69, at 918 (discussing the history of the community standard prong
of the obscenity test and concluding that a local standard is better than a national standard
because communities should not have their standards set by other communities); Handelman,
supra note 10, at 730.
207
Stepka, supra note 69, at 918 (arguing that a willing viewer who downloads obscene
material from the Internet is analogous to a willing person traveling to another community and
returning with the material); “[T]he ‘community standards’ criterion as applied to the Internet
means that any communication available to a nation-wide audience will be judged by the
standards of the community most likely to be offended by the message.” Reno II, 117 S. Ct.
2329, 2347 (1997); see generally Stephan Wilske and Teresa Schiller, International
Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Which States May Regulate the Internet?, 50 FED. COMM. L.J.
117 (1997) (finding states should exercise jurisdiction over the Internet because international
solutions are still at an early state of development).
208
Stepka, supra note 69, at 918. According to Joey Manely, director of Free Speech
Internet Television, a co-plaintiff in the current suit, COPA is “a thinly veiled attempt to
impose the community standards of the most repressive communities in America on all of the
Internet community.” Nickell, supra note 182.
209
Stepka, supra note 69, at 935-36; Wu, supra note 13, at 302-03; see generally Flaming,
supra note 200.
210
Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to
the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1652-54 (1995) (analyzing the
options of which community standard to apply to the Internet, including the community of
the provider, the downloading user, or the virtual community, concluding if it negatively
impacts the local community the jurisdictional rules of the geographical location should
apply); Joanna H. Kim, Comment, Cyber-Porn Obscenity: The Viability of the Local
Community Standards and the Federal Venue Rules in the Computer Network Age, 15 LOY.
L.A. ENT . L.J. 415, 430, 441 (1995) (finding it is “more reasonable to use the ‘virtual
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argue that the privacy established while the user is on the computer isolates him from
the geographic community.211
Problems with implementing this option include the following: even while on-line the
user remains part of the geographic community; the scope of the on-line community is
difficult to define as not all users access the same services; and the virtual community
may choose to reject an aspect of traditional government, forcing lawmakers outside
the virtual community to recognize a form of government with which they disagree. 212
In order to illustrate the difficulty of applying the Miller community standard to the
Internet, it is necessary to return to the case of United States v. Thomas. 213 The
Thomas’s ran their adults-only Internet bulletin board system out of their home in
Milpitas, California. 214 Federal agents indicted them in Memphis, Tennessee, where the
U.S. Postal Inspector was sitting at the time he browsed the Thomas’s BBS.215
The court disregarded the suggestion of a virtual community standard because the
Thomas’s required users to submit an application to join the BBS, and based on that
information, they should have known that users in Memphis viewed their pornographic
material. 216 Ironically, although the Thomas’s were never in Tennessee, they were
convicted on pornography charges in Tennessee for violation of Tennessee law by a
Tennessee jury applying the Memphis community standard as dictated by Miller. 217
community’ to judge whether material is obscene” when a BBS [bulletin board service] is
involved because those users that may be harmed by the allegedly obscene material are those
that affirmatively access the BBS).
211
Stepka, supra note 69, at 935. The idea behind the virtual community is:
that on-line computer users form a sufficiently robust community to be recognized
by the law, at least for purposes of the Miller obscenity analysis . . . . [The idea is
plausible as] a result of the inherent privacy of the user/computer relationship. This
privacy isolates the computer user from his or her geographic community, and
imparts a feeling of participation in a self-sufficient on-line community.
Id.; see generally Robert C. Bordone, Electronic Online Dispute Resolution: A Systems
Approach--Potential, Problems, and a Proposal, 3 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 175 (1998)
(suggesting the implementation of a dispute resolution system for cyberspace which
integrates the customs and rules of virtual communities).
212
Stepka, supra note 69, at 935-36; Flaming, supra note 200, at 181 (arguing that allowing
the Internet community to develop its own rules and resolve internal disputes may end up
challenging the country’s traditional form of government because the Internet community
favors decentralization and opposes hierarchy).
213
74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
214
Id. at 705. The Thomas’s followed FCC rules by requiring users to pay for bulletin
board use with credit cards. Goldman, supra note 12, at 1105 n.162. Users could download,
view, and print pornographic materials after paying a membership fee and receiving a
password. Thomas 74 F.3d at 705.
215
Goldman, supra note 12, at 1105-06. A U.S. Postal inspector, working undercover,
downloaded obscene pictures from the Thomas’s hard drive. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 705. As a
member of the bulletin board the inspector had access to 17,000 sexual and graphic computer
photos, indexed by topics including bestiality, torture or pedophilia. Id.
216
Thomas, 74 F.3d at 710-11. The application required applicants to the BBS to fill in their
name, address, phone number and signature. Id. at 705.
217
Pollack, supra note 38, at 475 (concluding the Miller holding is ineffective in a time of
changing technology and communication because what constitutes a community is also
changing).
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The end result is that the values of a more conservative jurisdiction in Tennessee may
govern Internet speech all over the world.218
Because the standard can produce different results based on the location of the
receiver, reasonable users will be unable to predict what is deemed harmful to
minors.219 This may deter constitutionally protected speech because speakers who
cannot meet the infeasible affirmative defenses of COPA220 will be hesitant to share
material over the Internet for fear of being charged with violating the “harmful to
minors” standard of a distant community.221 The community standard incorporated
into Internet legislation prevents users like the Thomas’s from understanding what is
invalid and subjects them to penalties if their guess proves to be wrong.222
Justice Stevens’ finding in Reno v. ACLU223 regarding the vagueness of the CDA is
equally applicable to this idea, as it “may well cause speakers to remain silent rather than
communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and images.”224 Even if the user
knows the location of the community whose standards govern, a determination of
whether the material in question offends those standards remains entirely subjective.225
218

Id. Handelman, supra note 10, at 731 (finding all users mu st follow values of the most
restrictive community if the Miller standard applies to the Internet).
219
Clapes, supra note 35, at 7; see also Gobla, supra note 8, at 129 (“Due to the very
nature of the Internet, defining a community by which to judge potentially offensive material
is impossible.”); David J. Loundy, Knee-jerk Reaction Not a ‘Healthy Thing,’ CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Jan. 11, 1996, at 6 (noting web site authors must remember, when designing their sites,
that they may subject themselves to many different regulations in many different countries).
220
For a discussion on the technological and economic infeasibility of the affirmative
defenses of COPA, see supra notes 184-188 and accompanying text.
221
William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to
the Virtual Community, 30 W AKE FOREST L. REV. 197, 210 (1995) (finding if Internet users are
forced to restrict speech to comply with the most restrictive community standards one of two
results will occur: (1) ideas will remain unexpressed or (2) the Internet community, as a whole,
will block access to users located in restrictive jurisdictions; finding either option chills free
speech); Handelman, supra note 10, at 737. According to David Sobel, general counsel for
the Electronic Privacy Information Center and co-counsel for the plaintiffs, “In order to avoid
potential prosecution, a lot of the material would potentially disappear because a lot of sites
would not want to risk being hauled into court in Mississippi or some such place.” Nickell,
supra note 182. Also,
[R]equiring users to provide identifying information prior to being able to even
browse a site to determine what it offers will deter users from entering those sites,
and will reduce the commercial opportunities provided to plaintiffs and other
speakers using the Web. Requiring adults to identify themselves before they can
access speech defined as “harmful to minors” will also stigmatize that speech and
thus deter access to protected speech.
ACLU Complaint, supra note 174.
222
Allison, supra note 128, at 116.
223
117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (striking down portions of the CDA because the Act suppressed
valid adult speech in an effort to protect minors from harmful speech).
224
Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2344-45. The majority noted the Miller community standard was
not unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 2345.
225
Clapes, supra note 35, at 7. The Starr Report is an example of material that some
communities may deem harmful to minors while others may not. Sequel, supra note 1. Peggy
Peterson, communication director for Representative Michael Oxley (R-Ohio), sponsor of
COPA, claims COPA would not censor the Starr Report. Id. However, “the fact that filtering
programs blocked the report and that MSNBC online . . . blocked portions of Clinton’s
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C. The Internet Does Not Fit Into Any Traditional Medium Category . . . Yet
The Supreme Court created a “spectrum of control” which determines the
appropriate First Amendment analysis for speech on various forms of technological
communications.226 The least protected medium for speech is broadcasting because it
enters the home with no invitation227 and it suffers from a scarcity of frequencies.228
In the middle is cable television because it can be accessed with affirmative steps 229 and
is potentially pervasive. The most protected medium is the telephone because users
must take deliberate, affirmative steps to access the service. 230 Currently, the Internet
does not closely resemble any of these traditional categories.231
If the Court is compelled to fit the Internet into a category, it seems to resemble the
dial-a-porn rationale of Sable more than that of broadcasting or cable television for two
reasons.232 First, the Internet is not pervasive; it is not an intruder.233 Like dial-a-porn
users, the computer user takes deliberate steps to invite the Internet into his home. 234
According to Lisa M. Fantino, reporter and writer for WCBS -AM Radio in New York,
NY:
[T]he Internet explorer must make a monthly decision whether to continue
his subscription to the Internet and, if dissatisfied, he may cancel his
subscription at any time. The Internet explorer is a pilot charting his own
course. By virtue of the subscription-only access, innocent bystanders
testimony demonstrates that some people do consider Clinton’s cigar shenanigans harmful to
minors.” Id.
226
Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2341-44; Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,
518 U.S. 727, 774-75 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) (finding the constitutionally of indecency
regulation for a medium depends partly on the characteristics of that medium).
227
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731 n.2 (1978); Robert Cannon, The Legislative
History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency Act: Regulating Barbarians on the
Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L. J. 51, 79 (1996) (discussing the Supreme Court’s
First Amendment analysis of various communication media and how it considers the unique
characteristics of each, as well as whether the government interest presented is compelling;
concluding the Internet “is the opportunity for all citizens to have a voice” and the value of
that opportunity outweighs the possible harm of offensive speech).
228
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396 (1969); Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731
n.2; see supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
229
Werst, supra note 31, at 220; see supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
230
Werst, supra note 31, at 220.
231
Id. at 224 (finding the Internet is different than other communication technologies due
to its evolution free of any content-based considerations, decentralization with no single
point of control, global reach and the fact that users have no ability to select their audience).
232
The majority in Reno found the Internet was analogous to dial-a-porn, rather than
broadcast media and cable television. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2343 (1997). Therefore, the
CDA was subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 2344.
233
Id. at 2343 (affirming that Internet communications do not invade a user’s home; users
rarely encounter sexually explicit content by accident; and most of the sexually explicit
Internet material is preceded by content warnings).
234
Symposium, Panel III: Restricting Speech on the Internet: Finding an Appropriate
Regulatory Framework, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP . MEDIA & ENT . L.J. 395, 413 (1998)
[hereinafter Restricting Speech] (stating the views of panelist, Lisa M. Fantino, reporter and
writer for CBS radio station WCBS-AM in New York City, who believes Congress suppressed
free speech through the enactment of the CDA); Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2343.
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cannot be offended . . . nor can children . . . access World Wide Web sites
without the knowledge to type commands that will get them there.235

Accessing content on the Internet requires more knowledge, as well as more deliberate
and affirmative steps, than merely turning a dial to access the radio or television.236
Second, the Internet is not afflicted with a scarcity of broadcast frequencies.237 On the
contrary, whenever a new computer connects to the Internet, the Internet’s capabilities
and size increase. 238
It is important to note that the Internet’s exemption from protected speech regulation
may be only temporary.239 Cable modems and media alliances are beginning to turn the
Internet into a type of medium closer to that of broadcasting.240 The Court relied upon
specific Internet characteristics when determining the appropriate level of First
Amendment protection. If these characteristics no longer exist, the protection also may
disappear.241
D. Existing Obscenity & Pornography Laws Work
Although the Internet presents unique characteristics for legal application, there is no
reason to believe it will force courts to abandon well-established legal concepts merely
because the speech in question is communicated by computer.242 “Protected speech
should be protected speech, no matter what its form.”243 Some courts have easily
applied existing legal restrictions on various forms of speech to Internet
communication.244

235

Restricting Speech, supra note 234, at 413 (footnotes omitted).
Reno I, 929 F. Supp. 824, 845 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
237
Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2344.
238
Pollack, supra note 38, at 483. But see Allison, supra note 128, at 128-29 (arguing the Internet
may suffer from scarce resources in the future because the Internet is growing rapidly and straining the
resources which handle the increased traffic).
239
Allison, supra note 128, at 132-33; The Supreme Court in Reno determined the Internet was
entitled to full protection of the First Amendment. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2344.
240
Clapes, supra note 35, at 9.
241
Allison, supra note 128, at 132-33.
242
William Bennett Turner, The First Amendment and the Internet, 482 PLI/Pat 33, 52-53
(1997) (finding general state and federal laws established for other forms of communication
are equally applicable to the Internet); see generally William Bennett Turner, Federal and
State Attempts to Regulate the Internet after Reno v. ACLU, 520 PLI/Pat 595 (1998) (listing
recent proposals for state and federal Internet regulation); Charles S. Sims, After the
Communications Decency Act: Content Regulation in the Electronic Age, 516 PLI/Pat 447
(1998) (discussing the historical development of obscenity and indecency regulation prior to
the CDA and proposed regulations after the Court struck down the CDA).
243
Peter Ludlow, Introduction to Chapter IV of HIGH NOON ON THE ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER, CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN CYBERSPACE, 253, 253 (Peter Ludlow ed., 1996) (discussing
United States v. Thomas and determining the community standard of the Miller obscenity
test should not be applied to the Internet).
244
Jessica McCausland, Regulating Computer Crime after Reno v. ACLU: The Myth of
Additional Regulations, 49 FLA. L. REV. 483, 491 (1997) (finding some courts have had little or
no trouble applying established law to the new Internet situations and discussing the case of
United States v. Thomas, which involved Internet obscenity).
236
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For example, in United States v. Thomas245 federal agents charged the Thomas’s
with violating federal anti-obscenity laws, including 18 U.S.C. §1465, which specifically
regulates the “transportation of obscene matters for sale or distribution.”246 The
defendants argued the statute did not apply to intangible objects such as computer
files.247 The court disagreed and construed the federal obscenity law to include
computer transmissions because the action allowed hard copies to be transmitted to
distant locations.248
In United States v. Carroll, 249 the defendant was charged under the existing federal
child pornography statute250 after his wife discovered that he took sexually-explicit
photographs of his 13-year old niece with the intention of distributing them on the
Internet.251 The First Circuit Court of Appeals found that the transmission of
photographs over the Internet was equivalent to transporting them in interstate
commerce and affirmed the defendant’s conviction.252
The legislature passed these and other statutes long ago to criminalize such activities
as the distribution of pornography.253 COPA and any future regulations enacted for this
type of crime committed via the Internet result in double criminal liability for a
defendant merely because he used a computer. 254 This implies crimes committed over
the Internet are somehow more culpable. 255 To the contrary, the distribution of
245

74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996). For a discussion of the Thomas case, see supra notes 21318 and accompanying text.
246
18 U.S.C. §1465 (1994 & Supp. 1997). The statute states, in part:
Whoever knowingly transports or travels in, or uses a facility or means of, interstate
or foreign commerce or an interactive computer service . . . in or affecting such
commerce for the purpose of sale or distribution of any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or
filthy book, pamp hlet, picture, film . . . or any other matter of indecent or immoral
character, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
Id.
247
Thomas, 74 F.3d at 706.
248
Id. at 707-08.
249
105 F.3d 740 (1st Cir. 1997).
250
18 U.S.C. §2251(a) (1994); This section states:
Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor
to engage in . . . any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any
visual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished . . . if such person knows or has
reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported in interstate or foreign
commerce or mailed, or if such visual depiction has actually been transported in
interstate or foreign commerce or mailed.
Id.
251
Carroll, 105 F.3d at 741-42. The defendant’s wife found two rolls of undeveloped film
which containted 46 photos of their 13 year-old niece posing suggestively with sex toys and
dressed in lingerie. Id. at 741. The court affirmed the defendant’s conviction under the
federal child pornography statute. Id. at 745.
252
Id. at 742. The court found the transmission of photos via the Internet was the same as
moving them across state lines and therefore, equivalent to transportation in interstate
commerce. Id.
253
McCausland, supra note 244, at 496.
254
Id. at 497-98 (arguing a pedophile who looks for minors at an elementary school to
sexually exploit is just as culpable as one that reaches the same goal via the Internet).
255
Id.
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pornography is no more dangerous over the Internet than through the mail. 256 The
Internet does not increase these crimes, it just makes them easier to commit.257 For
example, “[c]hild pornographers are going to do what they do with or without the
internet,”258 as the Internet is just another method for delivery of pornographic
material. 259 Therefore, this second wave of obscenity and pornography regulation is
difficult to justify based on the idea that courts cannot apply existing laws or that a
computer makes certain crimes more dangerous.260
E. Effective Alternatives to Government Regulation
There are many varieties of filtering and blocking computer programs available
which screen out access to questionable Internet material. 261 These programs
empower parents with an effective tool to supervise their children’s use of the
Internet.262 This is the least restrictive means available to meet the government’s goal
of protecting minors from indecency, while preserving the fundamental right to free
speech.263
Filtering or blocking software blocks access to questionable web sites according to
PICS (Platform for Internet Content Selection).264 PICS is a set of standards written in
256

Id. at 500 (finding the existence of the Internet has not increased the prevalence of
crimes involving pornography).
257
Id. (describing the arguments of those that oppose government regulation of the
Internet).
258
Id. at 499 (quoting Robbie Honerkamp, engineer for Mindspring Enterprises and former
Director of Electronic Frontiers of Georgia).
259
Id. at 500 (finding that only a small percentage of pornographic material is produced for
the Internet). For example, a distributor of child pornography will upload pictures to their web
page rather than spending money on postage to distribute the material through the United
States Postal Service. Id. at 499-500.
260
McCausland, supra note 244, at 498-500. Because the existing laws work for these
crimes and it is unclear whether crimes have increased due to Internet use, new regulations
are unnecessary. Id. at 500. Compare John C. Scheller, PC Peep Show: Computers, Privacy,
and Child Pornography, 27 J. M ARSHALL L. REV. 989, 1013 (1994) (concluding that current
legislation does not work effectively to control child pornography transmission on the
Internet, and in order for new legislation to be effective it must destroy the anonymity of the
illegal transmissions).
261
Restricting Speech, supra note 234, at 414. The industry developed this software to
aid parents in the supervision of their children’s Internet access. Id. The programs screen
out questionable web pages. Id.
262
Dobeus, supra note 19, at 656 (concluding parents must be responsible for the content
their children access on the Internet in their homes because “[u]ser control of Internet
content” and existing laws are adequate to protect children from potentially harmful Internet
content).
263
Restricting Speech, supra note 234, at 414-15; Action for Children’s Television v. FCC,
58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Broadcasters, authors, listeners, program suppliers and viewers
challenged section 16(a) of the Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, which was enacted to
protect minors from indecent radio and television programs by limiting the hours in which
they could be broadcast. Id. at 656. The Act made an exception for public radio and television
stations. Id. The court found the government had a compelling interest in protecting
children. Id. However, it held the Act was not the least restrictive means to obtain the
government’s goal. Id. at 682.
264
Platform for Internet Content Selection (visited Jan 22, 1999)
<http://www.w3.org/PICS/> (providing specific information on PICS, including links to pages
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a common language used by rating services to label Internet content.265 The filtering
software allows private parties to choose the ratings they prefer and block any material
they do not want to access.266 The software is commercially accessible from
numerous companies.267
Some of the software manufacturers also serve as the rating service for their
filtering product, such as Cyber Patrol268 and CYBERsitter.269 Cyber Patrol rates sites
using fifteen categories including “violence/profanity” and “sexual acts” and within each
category assigns a label of CyberNOT or CyberYES.270 On the other end of the
spectrum, CYBERsitter blocks from single lists of questionable sites with no
opportunity to block only a portion of any list.271
Another rating service is the Recreational Software Advisory Council (RSAC) which
also follows the PICS standard in its own rating system (RSACi).272 Under this
system, web site creators voluntarily rate their own site content based on the categories
of violence, nudity, sex and language. 273 This system is available on SurfWatch,
describing technical specifications and frequently asked questions).
265
PICS provides a standard labeling format so the filtering software can process a PICS
complaint label. Gobla, supra note 8, at 125-26. Creators or third parties may use a PICS
based ratings system to label individual web sites. Paul Resnick and James Miller, PICS:
Internet
Access
Controls
Without
Censorship
(visited
10/25/98)
<http://www.w3.org/PICS/iacwcv2.htm> (concluding that filtering software using the PICS
labeling language can meet diverse needs unlike a blanket restriction, which can never meet
everyone’s needs).
266
Jeffrey Rosen, Zoned Out: Can the Government Stop Cyberporn?, NEW REPUBLIC ,
Mar. 31, 1997, at 15.
267
David K. Djavaherian, Reno v. ACLU, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 371, 383 (1998). The
software blocks certain questionable sites and prevents “inappropriate search terms” from
being used. Id. at 384. For prices of some of the available software programs, see infra notes
268-269.
268
Cyber Patrol allows parents to restrict children’s access to certain hours of the day,
limit total on-line time, and block access to specific web sites. The Cyber Patrol Fact Sheet
(visited 11/15/98) <http://www.cyberpatrol.com/fact. htm>. A company team, including
parents and teachers, reviews web sites. Id. The price of the software is $29.95 for the first
three months and subsequent 12-month subscriptions cost $29.95. How to Download/Order,
Register/Review,
Upgrade
&
Price
Cyber
Patrol
(visited
11/15/98)
<http:/www.cyberpatrol.com/cp_order.htm#pricing>.
269
CYBERsitter claims to block 100,000’s of sites unsuitable for children, such as sites
regarding pornography, sexual issues and racism. CYBERsitter For a Family Friendly
Internet (visited 11/15/98) <http://www.solidoak. com/cybinfo.htm>. The price is $39.95 with
no additional charges for updates. Id.
270
The CyberNOT label criteria relate to advocacy information, such as how to obtain
inappropriate materials and how to build, grow or use them. Cyber Patrol CyberNOT List
Criteria (visited 11/15/98) <http://www.micro sys.com/cyber/cp_list.htm>. The categories do
not relate to sites expressing an opinion or educational information. Id.
271
CYBERsitter For a Family Friendly Internet, (visited 11/15/98)
<http://www.solidoak.com/cysitter.htm>.
272
The Software Publishers Association created RSAC in 1994 to establish a rating
system for computer games and other media, such as the Internet. Recreational Software
Advisory Council on the Internet (visited 11/15/98) <http://www.rsac.org/homepage.asp>.
273
Gobla, supra note 8, at 127-28. A web site questionnaire allows providers to rate their
own sites using the system. Recreational Software Advisory Council on the Internet (visited
11/15/98) <http://www.rsac.org/homepage.asp>.
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CyberPatrol 3.0 and Microsoft Internet Explorer 3.0.274 Parents use a password to
select the level of each category for their child.275 If a content provider does not selfrate his web site, it is blocked.276 There are three important advantages to using
filtering software rather than government regulation to protect children from indecent
Internet content:
First, blocking [and/or filtering] software is available from several different
companies at little or no cost. Second, the software can filter across jurisdictional
boundaries . . . allow[ing] the user to block offensive Internet content that originates
. . . from anywhere in the world. . . . Third, the First Amendment right to free speech
is better served by user based filtering programs rather than any form of government
regulation . . . . 277

Like anything else in the technological world, these software programs are not
perfect. Regulation supporters argue software which filters material rated by third
parties is deficient for two reasons. First, because the software cannot block every
questionable site, a determined child could bypass the filter and find indecency on the
Internet.278 Second, critics claim the software is overly effective in that it blocks
access to sites with appropriate material. 279 For example, some of the programs utilize
string-recognition software which rejects certain four-letter words embedded in text.280
CYBERsitter utilized this feature to white out certain selected words while displaying
the rest of the text, resulting in changing the sentence “President Clinton opposes
274

Gobla, supra note 8, at 127-28.
Id. at 128.
276
Dobeus, supra note 19, at 634; Jonathan Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT . L.J. 453, 472-74 (1997). Unrated sites must be blocked or too many
questionable sites will filter through. Id. at 471. The majority of the industry believes
blocking unrated sites is necessary, or the rating system will not be useful. Id. at 471-72.
277
Dobeus, supra note 19, at 657 (footnotes omitted). According to the plaintiffs in ACLU
v. Reno II:
Unlike the COPA, user-based solutions provide a way for concerned parents to
prevent sexually oriented material from reaching minors: (1) from foreign sites; (2)
from amateur or non-commercial commercial sites; and (3) from sites that require a
credit card for payment. The use of such software is also notably less restrictive
than the COPA’s criminal ban.
American Civil Liberties Union Freedom Network, Temporary Restraining Order Brief in
ACLU v. Reno II (visited Nov. 20, 1998) <http://www.aclu.org/court/acluvrenoII_tro.html>
[hereinafter TRO Brief].
278
Robert W. Peters, There is a Need to Regulate Indecency on the Internet, 6 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB . POL’Y 363, 364 (1997); see also Jon Bigness, Sifting Problems of Web Filters, CHI.
TRIB ., Feb. 16, 1998, at 3 (noting filtering software effectiveness depends a great deal on the
taste level and care of the publishers that produce the software because the publisher
chooses the sites they consider inappropriate for children).
279
Electronic Privacy Information Center, Faulty Filters: How Content Filters Block
Access to Kid-Friendly Information on the Internet (Dec. 1997) (visited Jan 21, 1999)
<http://www2.epic.org/reports/filter-report.html> (finding that filtering software prevented
kids from accessing useful information available on the Internet as evidenced by a test the
Center conducted which showed out of 100 searches, the software prevented access to
almost 90 percent of material which contained the search terms because of the filter); see
generally David J. Loundy, Filtering Software Poses Legal Pitfalls, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
March 12, 1998, at 5.
280
Weinberg, supra note 276, at 460.
275
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homosexual marriage” to “President Clinton opposes marriage.”281 However,
companies may solve these types of problems by improving software design.282
Self-rating systems receive criticism because they require authors of Internet
content to voluntarily rate their sites with rigid labels.283 If they refuse to apply a label,
filters will probably block the site. 284 Critics argue that this leaves little incentive to selfrate sites containing questionable material because filtering software blocks it,
regardless of whether it is rated.285 However, self-rating systems are a less restrictive
means to protect children than government regulation.
This is a free market economy. If consumers (parents) wish to purchase filtering
software that is “overly effective” and blocks unrated sites, that is their choice. 286 If
consumers want access to unrated sites, they may purchase a less effective type of
software. The objective behind the creation of filtering software was to empower
parents to monitor children’s Internet access to indecency, rather than passing
government regulations to do so.287 Now we need to let parents use that power as they
see fit.288 This includes acknowledging that consumers have a choice of which
software to buy based on, in part, their feelings regarding the imperfections of the
various software programs.

281

Id. Another example of a difficulty with string-recognition software occurred when
software utilized by America Online would not let users from “Scunthorpe,” England, register
with the service. Id. Also, Surfwatch software prevented the University of Kansas Medical
Center from accessing their own “Archie R. Dykes Medical Library [sic].” Id. Some
companies, like CYBERsitter, filter out gay and lesbian sites even when they do not contain a
reference to sex. Id. at 461. This is most likely a temporary setback because eventually most
rating services will correct the labels on each of these document. Id. at 460.
282
Id.
283
Rappaport, supra note 144, at 807; Charlie Stross, RSACi Ratings Dissected (vis ited
10/25/98) <http://www.antipope.org/charlie/nonfiction/rant/rsaci.html> (finding RSACi system
cannot evaluate content for literary, educational or social value and, therefore, labels force the
author of a safe sex message to group it with web sites depicting explicit sexual material).
284
Weinberg, supra note 276, at 471-72 (finding that rating services will probably block
access to all unrated sites because too much questionable material would filter through for
them to market themselves as reliable screeners).
285
Dobeus, supra note 19, at 647. The legislature introduced a bill mandating that Internet
access providers provide screening software to permit parents to control internet access by
their children. Family-Friendly Internet Access Act of 1997, H.R. 1180, 105th Cong. (1997).
Compare Weinberg, supra note 276, at 473-77 (finding a mandatory self-rating law is
unconstitutional because it requires a speaker to associate himself with an idea with which he
disagrees).
286
Weinberg, supra note 276, at 476 (finding that even if software did not block unrated
sites, parents still may restrict children’s access to them by instructing the software to block
unrated sites).
287
Restricting Speech, supra note 234, at 415 (stating the industry voluntarily developed
filtering software as a tool for parents to use in limiting access by their children to
questionable material on the Internet).
288
The Supreme Court has a long line of precedent recognizing parental rights to raise
their children as they see fit. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking
down a law that required children to attend public schools because it interfered with the
rights of parents to direct the education of their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) (striking down a law that banned teaching children foreign languages because it
interfered with parent’s rights to control the education of their children).
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Parents who allow their children to participate in new technology must step forward
and assume the responsibility of protecting them.289 Giving parents the responsibility of
monitoring their children allows them to shield their children as they see fit, while
“making the Internet a safer place for the Constitution.”290 Parents should not look to
Congress to legislate away parental responsibility that is “part and parcel of rearing
children.”291 Allowing Congress to do so
gets the federal government into a job in which it has no business - parenthood, a
job which doubtless should be left to parents. Any parents who believe they need
the government’s help to raise their kids should be forced to leave their 16-year-old
daughter with Bill Clinton for a weekend. 292

IV. CONCLUSION
The Internet is a vast global universe of ideas and interactive communication. Entry
into this universe is inexpensive, as well as fast, effective, and anonymous. It is unlike
any other form of media encountered in our planet’s history.
Federal regulations employed to regulate the unique characteristics of the Internet
will lead to a ruling of unconstitutionality.293 The CDA was the victim of such a
decision after the government’s first round of Internet legislation.294 COPA is the
second round of legislation and it also raises First Amendment questions. This time the
legislation attempts to regulate under the guise of “the protection of children.”295 No
matter how one feels about the importance of protecting children from harmful
materials, COPA is still unconstitutional because it is not narrowly tailored to meet that
goal. 296

289

Gobla, supra note 8, at 129. According to Albert Vezza, an MIT senior research
scientist working on the development of filtering software standards, technology is just a tool
and “[t]he real answer is parenting: understanding what your kids are doing online, talking to
them about it and guiding them.” Peters, supra note 278, at 366; see also Anne R. Carey and
Web Bryant, USA Snapshots: Who’s Watching Kids On Line, USA TODAY, Sept. 24, 1998, at
1A (finding the following percentages of parents whose children have Internet access sit with
the children and participate: 36% Never; 25% Occasionally; 24% Always; 13% Rarely; and 2%
Don’t Know).
290
Wu, supra note 13, at 301. But see Clapes, supra note 35, at 10 (finding it is not
primarily the parent’s burden to protect children from indecent material on the Internet
because it is the industry that brought obscenity into homes, and therefore, it has
commensurate responsibility to control it).
291
Restricting Speech, supra note 234, at 415.
292
Myers, supra note 182, at A4.
293
Gobla, supra note 8, at 128-29 (finding any federal law will be overbroad and
unconstitutional because it is impossible to define a community by which to judge what
material is unlawful).
294
Reno II, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2349-51 (1997) (striking down portions of the CDA due to
vagueness and overbreadth).
295
For a discussion on COPA and the reasons for which Congress enacted it, see supra
Part I.F.
296
For discussion on why COPA is unconstitutional, see supra Part III.A & B. Any
content-based regulation is subject to strict scrutiny, which means the regulation must be
necessary to serve a compelling government interest and must be narrowly tailored to achieve
that interest. Arkansas Writers’ Project Inc., v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987).
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Parents who allow their children to use the Internet must step up and assume the
responsibility to protect them from harmful materials, in spite of the fact it may be
easier to “pass the buck” to the government.297 Filtering software offers parents an
effective solution and is far less restrictive than COPA, which imposes criminal
penalties on constitutionally protected speech between adults.298 Therefore, Internet
regulation should begin at home.
Kelly M. Doherty
297

Myers, supra note 182, at A4 (finding speech cannot be criminalized just because some
find it potentially harmful to children); Gobla, supra note 8, at 129. “Those parents who allow
their children to participate in that [new] technology must also accept the responsibility of
monitoring their children.” Id.
298
TRO Brief, supra note 277 (noting that Congress recognized it had not done thorough
research on other alternatives before passing COPA and concluding that if Congress had
done a thorough investigation, it would have revealed other less restrictive available
alternatives).
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